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# **Migration, Refugees and the Environment from Security Perspectives**

**Edited by Akihiro Iwashita, Jusen Asuka and Jonathan Bull**

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## PROGRAM

### **Session A Migration and refugees in Northeast Asia**

#### **Chair**

**Akihiro Iwashita** (Hokkaido University, Japan)

#### **Speakers**

**Hyunjoo Naomi Chi** (Hokkaido University, Japan)

**Mitsuhiro Mimura** (The Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, Japan)

**Yuji Fukuhara** (University of Shimane, Japan)

**Serghei Golunov** (Kyushu University, Japan)

#### **Commentator**

**Jong Seok Park** (Kyushu University, Japan)

### **Session B Migration, refugees and the environment**

#### **Chair**

**Jusen Asuka** (Tohoku University, Japan)

#### **Speakers**

**Nina Hall** (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Bologna, Italy)

**John Campbell** (University of Waikato, New Zealand)

**Benoit Mayer** (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

#### **Commentator**

**Kentaro Ono** (Honorary Consul of the Republic of Kiribati in Sendai, Japan)

### **Roundtable discussion**

#### **Chair**

**Atsushi Ishii** (Tohoku University, Japan)

## FOREWORD

We are pleased to announce the second research publication for the National Institute for the Humanities (NIHU) Area Studies Project for Northeast Asia, jointly organized by the Center for Northeast Asian Studies (CNEAS), Tohoku University and the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center (SRC), Hokkaido University. This issue comes as a special edition of the on-line journal *Northeast Asia Today* (<https://hokudaislav-northeast.net/en/publication/>), part of the Slavic Eurasia Papers series.

This edition covers the international symposium “Migration, Refugees and the Environment from Security Perspectives” held on October 29, 2017 at Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan. This symposium was a collaborative event between the CNEAS and the SRC for comprehensive studies for Northeast Asia. During the NIHU project, the CNEAS is focusing on environmental studies while the SRC is examining international relations. This symposium targeted the interactive aspects of environment and security in/beyond the region, consisting of sessions on “Migration and Refugees in Northeast Asia” and on “Migration, Refugees and the Environment.”

The first session included three papers on Northeast Asian migration dynamism: marriage migrants and care workers in Japan and South Korea, North Korean workers in Mongolia and Chinese immigration in Russia. The second session paid attention to the nexus of climate change and migration, including the case of Oceania and institutional views beyond the region. The intensive discussion in both sessions led by moderators and commentators brought a new perspective for identifying the security and environment interaction for area studies.

We conclude that we need to find a way to overcome these challenges in Northeast Asia and the surrounding regions through a deep empirical and institutional but also philosophical analysis of the topics. Our mission is yet to reach its distant goal but we are approaching our destination of reshaping Northeast Asia for the future. Finally, the editors would like to thank the symposium participants and local coordinators, particularly, Jin Dan (CNEAS) and Mihoko Kato (SRC) for their contribution.

July 31, 2018

Akihiro Iwashita and Hiroki Oka



## SESSION A: MIGRATION AND REFUGEES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

### Where migration meets gender in Northeast Asia: marriage migrants and domestic care workers in Japan and South Korea Naomi Chi (Graduate School of Public Policy, Hokkaido University)

How many of you have seen the film called “My Wedding Campaign” (Figure 1). The Korean title is “*Na’euui Gyeolhon Weonjeonggi*”, or in Japanese, “*Watashi no kekkon shiki ensei ki*”. It’s a Korean movie that was produced in 2006. Basically, - I don’t want to spoil the movie and I hope you have a chance to watch it - the movie is about these two Korean gentlemen from the rural areas of Korea, who go to Uzbekistan to find their potential brides. Now, this is a fictitious movie, but it is based on real phenomena taking place in Korea.

So, today, my objective is to illustrate the dynamics of international migration of women in Japan and Korea. The second is to examine the background and the various pull factors of the feminization of migration in these two countries, and last, to give my observations on how cultural and institutional factors determine national policies and marriage and migration.

Japan and Korea used to be countries that exported migrants, but since the 1980s,



Figure 1

Source: IMDb database: <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0492702/>

with the economic growth, industrialization, and also with the high education and participation of women in the labor market, more women began to go outside of the home to work. In Japan, this trend started in the 1980s. In Korea, it started about 10 years later. There are various institutional arrangements that allow these women to come to Japan and Korea. For instance, in Japan and Korea, there is visa status for spouses of Japanese and Korean nationals. In terms of domestic and care work, there are also quite a few institutional provisions. For instance, in Japan, since 2004, there is the economic partnership agreement with the Philippines. This agreement has been extended to Vietnam and Indonesia to bring nurses and care workers to Japan. Also, in Japan, since the beginning of 2017, the visa status for care (*kaigo*, in Japanese), is an official working visa status in

Japan. Also, there is the training and internship program, (*ginō jisshū sei*) through which people can enter domestic care work.

In terms of Korea, Korea also has various legal institutions and institutional frameworks. For example, there is the EPS, which is the employment permit system, which was implemented in 2004. What this allows is people to come work in Korea for up to 5 years, and they can work in specific areas, and one is, of course, service. And also there is the H-2 visa, which is the co-ethnic program for overseas Koreans, and they can come to Korea to work for up to 5 years, and they can work — again, this is also for a specific industry, and one of them is care and domestic work. So, you can see that there are various legal and institutional frameworks for these women to come to Japan and Korea to marry and to work in domestic and care work.

Now, I have been conducting field work for some time, for over 10 years. I do have in my paper some of their narratives. I don't have enough time to go through them all today, but they are based on interviews that I have conducted, of course, with the consent of the people that I interviewed. I have been able to put them on my paper, so I hope that you go through them. I think it's really important that we listen to the voices of the people that are the women that marry these people in Japan and Korea. The women that do care for the people in Japan and Korea. So, I hope you have a look at it later.

These are also photos that I've taken — of course, again, with the consent of the people that are in the photos. In Japan and Korea, in terms of marriage migrants, in Japan, the marriage migrants started to come in the 1980s, and in Korea, in the 1990s. Now, for Japan, this is a photo of a program in Korea (Figure 2), but first let me look at Japan.

In Japan, in the 1980s, there were women, in the beginning from Korea, and also from China, that came to marry Japanese men in the rural areas of Japan. Some of the popular destinations were Yamagata and Niigata. And in Korea, the marriage migrants, where did they come from? Originally, in the 1990s, in the beginning, they



Figure 2

came from China. Many ethnic Koreans in China would come to marry Korean men, and also the Han Chinese as well. Recently, since the 2000s, women from Vietnam, and also from Mongolia, and also from the Philippines, and some of the CIS countries, come to marry Korean men.

In Japan, many of the local governments were quite tactical in inviting or organizing these programs for women to come to meet their potential husbands. This is also the same in Korea as well. Some of the local governments have facilitated these meetings for people to find their potential partners. this is a photo of a program in Korea (Figure 2). This is from 2008. It's just when I started doing my field work. This is the opening ceremony for a support center for multi-cultural families in Korea.

This next photo is from 2013 (Figure 3). This is the opening ceremony for information technology. It's to teach the marriage migrants programming and basic computer skills.

Of course, marriage migrants — not all marriages end up in a happy ending.



Figure 3

Unfortunately, some of the women do experience some domestic violence. They do have quite a few challenges. In Korea, since 2000, many women from Vietnam and also from Mongolia and the Philippines have come to marry Korean men. The reason why these women are popular is because they are viewed as being traditional and very obedient. And if you look at the numbers, the marriage migrants in Korea peaked in 2006, where almost 30% of the total marriages were international marriages, of which 80% were between Korean men and foreign women. Since then, in 2007 and 2008, and they are still currently occurring, but there have been some very unfortunate cases where these women, these foreign brides, have been killed by their husbands. Now, this particular case was a case of a 22-year old Vietnamese woman who married a Korean man through international brokers, and she arrived in Busan, and two weeks into her stay in Korea, she was murdered by her Korean husband, who was schizophrenic. And this is the mother of the Vietnamese woman, and the Korean

embassy sent a special envoy to apologize to the mother of the foreign bride that was killed in Korea. So, these cases have been occurring and re-occurring in Korea. Of course, there are now laws in terms of domestic violence. There are also shelters for these women to go to. In the beginning, the shelters were for Korean women, so they only had people who were only able to talk in the Korean language, but now it's multilingual, there's a 24-hour hotline, for these women to seek help.

This is a photo of these Vietnamese women who are protesting (Figure 4). This is right in front of the General Assembly in Korea, in Seoul, and they are protesting for more rights and for more strict laws regarding domestic violence against women in general. And this occurs quite often in Seoul where you see these women who are married to Korean men come out to protest and to ask for more rights.



Figure 4

In terms of support, there is support from the local government. There is also support from NGOs. And it is becoming more and more active. For instance, in Japan, there is the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations. It's a government organization that helps international migrants. There are also various legal affairs bureaus that help these women. Also, I work a lot with the NPOs in Japan. In Korea there are also quite a few support systems. There is the Korean women's hotline and emergency support centers all over major cities in Korea. Also, there are women's shelters in various areas where they have multilingual support.

The tentative observations that I have regarding the research that I've been conducting is that the idea of migrants having their own agency — this is something in migration studies where people now talk about the agency of each migrant — in terms of marriage migrants and also domestic and care workers, it's really difficult to say that they have agency, because many of these women, they feel obliged to come because they have pressure from their home country. Some of these women, they are college-educated, but because their family is poor, marriage is a quick way out to provide for them, not only for themselves, but for their family. The care and domestic work

itself is being outsourced to these women, and care and domestic work is obviously behind the doors. Many of the women who come to Japan and Korea, they work inside the family, so they are basically working behind shut doors. And so anything can occur, and there are human rights violations that take place, and we don't know very much about it, because it's behind closed doors. So, in the 21st century, we talk about mobility, it's more accessible, there are ways, it's easier to access resources, and it's also easier to go to another country because of logistics and transportation — technology has improved. But at the same time, when you look at the migrant women in both Japan and Korea, you see that they are very immobile, even in this age of mobility, because of the limitations of the institutional framework and also because of the way the programs are designed, and so I think it's important that we do look at agency, but also at the same time — people always say that marriage is something of a private affair, so we think that whatever happens at home stays at home, and the government shouldn't do anything about it. But that's not really the case. We need to have government step in to make sure these people's human rights are not violated.

Also, something I am now thinking about is the idea of justice of caring. I'm not a feminist scholar. I'm sort of learning from feminist theories, but I think the idea of justice of caring is something that we can work with. That is, instead of looking at just rights and morality in terms of justice, maybe we should approach from the care perspective.

So, with that, I will end my presentation. Thank you very much, everyone, for your attention.

[Question] I wondered if you could clarify the situation around domestic violence in Korea, because you mentioned that there were organizations supporting these women. Is it a broader social issue as well for South Korean women, and are there alliances between South Korean women and — you showed us a photo of the Vietnamese women protesting. So, what sort of alliances are there?

[Chi] Thank you for that question. Domestic violence used to be, and still is, very much a social problem. But because now many women are more highly educated — they also work; they're participating in the labor market, so in terms of the bigger cities, the cases of domestic violence have decreased, because there are laws that have been stipulated for domestic violence. The reason why domestic violence is higher with international migrants is because many of the women, they don't know how to access these resources. Since 2016 — I didn't want to go into detail, but since 2016, there is a language proficiency test that they have to pass. Before that, some of these women didn't speak a word of Korean. Of course, there are Korean language classes in Korea that teach these women the language, but when they come to Korea and when they first marry, through the brokers and whatnot, they don't really speak the language, so when they come, they don't know how to access these resources that are available to them. And also, they feel that if they say something about what's happening at home, that they would be deported, because of the way

that the institutional framework is set up, because they are on a spousal visa, which means, when they renew the spousal visa, they have to have their husband come with them to the immigration office with them, and there is also a provision, they need to have at least more than 30,000 US dollars as savings. And of course, many of these women don't work, so they have to rely on their Korean spouse to have that certificate that they have that savings. So, the women feel that if they can't renew the visa, they have to go home, and if they go home, they don't have income to send to their family. So, it's all sort of a snowball effect, and so that's why many of them keep silent. But now because of many of these resources available, they have been able to come out and say it. Also, there is a group of public lawyers that help these women as well. So, there have been more reported cases than before, but we still think that there are more out there. We just don't know about it.

[Question] What do you mean by "agency"? In my field, in international relations, agency is just a simple word for actors, but when I heard your presentation and read your paper, I think it's not just simply actors. There may be various definitions from various fields, so I think it's important to clarify the meaning of this word.

[Chi] In terms of migration studies, when we say, "agency", it means that these women have specific reasons and purpose to migrate. And so, there is a debate between those people who talk about the importance of agency, versus people who think these women are victims and we need to protect them. So, there's sort of a debate between these two groups. The people that do emphasize the idea of agency, that these women choose to move, that these women choose to marry these men, if we don't look at the agency of these women, the perspective of these women as being victims re-victimizes them. That's why many of the scholars say that we need to focus more on the agency.

## **Temporary workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Mongolia**

**Mitsuhiro Mimura** (The Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia)

**Yuji Fukuhara** (University of Shimane)

This presentation is based on fieldwork and interviews from 5 to 8 September 2017 in Ulan Bator, Mongolia. We went to construction sites and companies employing North Korean workers, and looked at the places of construction. We will report the contents of this fieldwork and discuss the significance of sending and receiving the North Korean workers from the viewpoint of Mongolia and DPRK relations.

Mongolia has a population of 3 million whereas the DPRK has 24 million. Although North Korea is very small, it has 8 times more population of Mongolia. Ulan Bator is the only large city in Mongolia and has a population of 1.5 million. Because the economy is growing, there is a lot of construction work.

In terms of history, Mongolia was established in 1924, and the DPRK was founded on 9 September 1948. After the USSR, the second country that established diplomatic relations with the DPRK was Mongolia in October 1948. During the Korean War, Mongolia supported North Korea together with the USSR and China, providing material support and horses. It also received many war orphans. From 1948 to 1989 was a honeymoon period for Mongolia-DPRK relations. North Korea had some flexibility about doing business with the USSR and China. Mongolia, on the other hand, was a landlocked country, located between the Soviet Union and China. Speaking bluntly, usually countries next to China don't like China. Of course, the countries next to Russia don't like Russia. Nevertheless, Mongolia chose to be a part of the Soviet Bloc, not China, and became a member of COMECON in 1962. The same year, North Korea withdrew from COMECON because of the bad relations between China and the Soviet Union. When the DPRK stepped back from the Soviet Union and China, Mongolia became a very good brother of the USSR.

There are differences on the attitude towards the big brothers. Nevertheless, North Korea and Mongolia had very good relations. Kim Il Sung visited Mongolia twice, and mutual visits of leaders, government parties and students were often made, and continuous cultural exchange was also performed. However, the honeymoon suddenly finished because of the democratization of Mongolia between the winter of 1989 to the spring of 1990. Mongolia introduced a multi-party system and abandoned the one-party dictatorship of the Mongolian People's Party which was the communist party. Mongolia decided to ask the Soviet Union to withdraw its army. Mongolia also started free trade that was monopolized by the state.

Mongolia recognized the Republic of Korea, the enemy of the DPRK, on 26 March 1990. This change happened in only six months. The DPRK then prohibited the entry of Mongolian citizens to North Korea with South Korean visas or an entry stamp of South Korea in their passport.

For Japanese citizens, it was permissible to go to South Korea and subsequently to enter North Korea. However, before Kim Dae-jung met Kim Jong-Il, those who had stayed more than three months in South Korea were prohibited from visiting North Korea. That is the reason why I (Mitsuhiro Mimura) didn't go to South Korea to study Korean. The two countries also maintained embassies.

In 1994 Mongolia started a new diplomatic policy. Mongolia expanded interactions and friendly relations with the former socialist communities and also with developing countries. The DPRK was included in developing countries. Mongolia established the Eastern Thought University, that taught the Juche ideas — not a philosophy, but anyway, a tool of governance of North Korea. North Koreans are happy to hear about foreigners learning Juche ideas. Whenever I go to North Korea, there is a lecture of Juche ideas for at least two hours. I have to pretend to listen very eagerly in order to have good relations with North Korean counterparts. The Mongol-Korea parliamentary group also visited the DPRK together with foreign ministers in 1997 and 1998. In the 1990s, therefore, the Mongolians tried to establish new relations not only with North Korea but also other countries in Asia.

As for more recent Mongolia-North Korea relations, in 2000 President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea visited Mongolia. The North Koreans were furious and temporarily closed their embassy in Ulaanbaatar. As well as providing a new embassy building, Mongolia also exempted North Koreans from a tax on foreign workers in an attempt to improve relations with the DPRK. This tax exemption remains and is one of the reasons why North Korean workers go to Mongolia. In August 2002, Paek Nam-sun, the DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Mongolia, and revised the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. In 2004 Mongolia signed an agreement with the DPRK to receive 10,000 North Korean workers. Many of these workers are employed on construction sites in and around Ulaanbaatar as the city expands.

Previously, more than 10,000 female workers were employed to engage in sewing at Gobi. Gobi was a state-owned enterprise that makes cashmere products and embroidery craftwork. Because the wages were relatively high, this was popular work. However, due to pressure by the United States, these workers were sent back to North Korea. As a result, currently most of the North Korean workers in Mongolia are male and working in construction.

How do North Korean workers come to Mongolia? Mongolian companies who want workers apply to one of about 60 larger companies. These larger companies communicate the job description and the number of workers required to the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia. If the documents are valid, the Ministry of Labor sends a request to their counterpart in North Korea. The DPRK Ministry of Labor then orders temporary staffing agencies in North Korea to recruit those workers to be sent to Mongolia. Some of the workers recruited are teachers, party officials and public servants in North Korea. Once the necessary number of workers have been recruited, the Ministry of Labor checks their identities to ensure each individual will be unlikely to defect. One reason for the mismatch of people sent, to work engaged in, is because of this identity checking. Real construction workers in North Korea are not always sent to construction sites in Mongolia. When selection is completed, a list of workers is sent to the Mongolian Embassy in Pyongyang. The Mongolian Embassy issues

visas and once the workers receive the notification that they are able to get a visa, they go to Mongolia. After arriving in Mongolia they receive training when necessary, and start to work.

What are the terms of a typical



Figure 1

Photographs of North Korean workers in Mongolia



Figure 2



Figure 3

contract? From 2017, no workers over 50 years are allowed. The terms of contracts can vary significantly. They range from six months to one year to five years. Different contracts provide different conditions so some include travel expenses from North Korea to Mongolia or an allowance for clothing, food, and shelter. Some include response to accidents, health insurance and the possibility of temporary return home during the contract period. The wages also vary significantly. A sum of \$1000 is high-end.

For the Mongolian side, the merits of Korean workers are firstly acceptance of low wages, secondly willingness to engage in heavy labor, and thirdly obedience. North Korean workers do not go on strike and accidents can be overlooked. Also, because North Koreans are exempt from the foreign workers' tax the wages paid can be lower than for other nationalities such as the Chinese.

Problems include the mismatch between the needs of employers and the skills of workers. Also, some employers don't pay wages. Such treatment increases the complaints of North Korean workers. In addition, the workers are occasionally unfamiliar with the machines and tools they are provided with. In North Korea most machinery is that of the 1960s and 1970s while in Mongolia it is of the 21st century.

These photographs (Figure 1,2 and 3) show an apartment building under construction.

North Koreans are doing the work.

These photographs also show North Korean workers, this time in the service sector. This is the White Flower (Figure 4), one of two North Korean restaurants in Ulaanbaatar. The other is called the Pyongyang Restaurant (Figure 5). We were not allowed to take a photo of the workers working inside the restaurant. Chinese and North Korean workers often work together in construction and also on farms and at hospitals and restaurants. Female workers are usually working in restaurants and the light industry sector. In North Korea many of them are engineers, teachers, researchers and soldiers.



Figure 4



Figure 5

What is the significance of sending and receiving workers for Mongolian-DPRK relations? Mongolia has retained friendly terms with North Korea (despite there having been fluctuations) since the Cold War ended depending on the Mongolian-South Korean relations. In 2011, Mongolia's new foreign policy guidelines and the country's labor shortage meant there were 'pull' factors for North Korean workers. For North Korea, the chance to earn foreign currency is attractive. For individuals, going to Mongolia to work represents a chance to live outside of North Korea. Many Mongolians are critical of the regime of the DPRK, but rarely directly to the people in Ulaanbaatar. The flow of workers from the DPRK to Mongolia is accepted in terms of mutual cooperation. The DPRK government does not regard the treatment of its North Korean workers as exploitative. In return, the Mongolian government says nothing about North Korea's development of nuclear power and armaments. This complicates relations with Japan, South Korea, and the US.

[Iwashita] We Japanese, in particular, often think that North Korea has been isolated by other countries, but the fact is not so simple. We have five minutes remaining so I will take a couple of questions.

[Question] I am interested in China. There are also many North Korean workers in China. What similarities and differences do you see in the case of North Korean workers in China and Mongolia?

[Fukuhara] Well, in the Mongolian case, the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia and the Ministry of Labor in North Korea cooperate on selection. In the case of China, there is much less government to government cooperation. Also, most of the North Korean

workers in China are female and work in the service sector and in light industrial production.

[Question] Can you give us some information about how you found the people who you interviewed? Also, did you have someone watching you when you were doing interviews? Did you just go to the building site and say you want to talk to people?

[Fukuhara] One of the foreign students in the University of Shimane is Mongolian, and her sister is a politician in Mongolia, so she has a lot of connections. Using that kind of path, we tried to find the companies that employed North Korean workers.

## Russian perceptions of Chinese immigration: between alarmism and utilitarianism

Serghei Golunov (Kyushu University)

Official statistics on the number of Chinese coming to Russia are often unreliable. This means estimates are frequently given but these can vary greatly. The first kind

of estimation is the alarmist estimation. According to this estimation, the number of

### Statistical data


It is difficult to find trustworthy estimations on the number of the Chinese in Russia. Here are available figures:

- a) Soviet and Russian censuses: 1989 – 11 thousand, 2002 – 35 thousand, 2010 – 29 thousand.

*The problem with censuses is that they poorly cover immigrants and those groups, who are not much willing to be counted (as they are afraid of prosecution). At the same time, Russian census workers could evade dealing with those ethnic communities who don't speak Russian well and could be quite able to falsify results.*

- b) Typically, Chinese citizens entered Russia several hundreds of thousands times per year (many of them could cross the border several times per year each). The record figure – 1417 thousands of border crossings - was reached in 2016.

### Statistical data



## Estimations

Available estimations of the numbers of Chinese visitors vary greatly. Usually, these estimations do not specify whether annual or an average "snapshot" number of immigrants is meant.

- 1) Alarmists (including scholars and officials ) argue that from 1,5 to 12 million of the Chinese reside in Russia and that the Chinese already prevail in some borderland areas.

*Usually, no justification is provided, sometimes differences between the annual number of entries and departures are referred. Most likely, these differences is actually caused by long-term stays, departures via different regions and countries (Belarus), and inaccuracies in recording those who depart.*

- 2) According to Russian Chinese Studies scholars, demographers, and competent immigration and security officials, the average number of Chinese in Russia is between 200 and 600 thousand.

*Most of these experts do not believe in 'too small' figures of Russian censuses.*

Chinese coming to Russia rose from 1.5 to 12 million. Alarmists argue that Chinese already prevail in some border areas of Russia. But usually no justification for this claim is provided.

The second kind of estimation is more moderate. According to this estimation, the average number of Chinese in Russia is between 200,000 and 600,000. Moscow is probably the main point of destination for Chinese coming to Russia, because it offers the largest opportunities. In terms of the sending region of China, Heilongjiang is in first place. It provides migrants to the Russian Far East, but some other regions provide immigrants to the regions of the European parts of Russia.

The majority of Chinese immigrants to Russia are either short-term or seasonal. This is a particular characteristic of those Chinese immigrants who come to the Russian Far East. It is also argued that there are no Chinese diaspora in the Far East, because China is nearer so there is less need to consolidate. There is a Chinese diaspora in Moscow that is a well-organized community, with financial services and media. These communities are isolated from the social environment because of poor command of Russian, and limited acceptance of 'strangers' by Russians. However, there are still no Chinatowns in Russian cities.

A large number of Chinese visitors are low-income rural dwellers. There are some negative perceptions of these groups. According to some sources, the Chinese are supposedly ill-mannered, unkempt, dishonest, and aggressive. These are supposedly characteristic of rural uneducated Chinese immigrants to Russia. These characteristics were extrapolated to Chinese as a whole in the 1990s. However, these stereotypes gradually weakened as Chinese immigration flows diversified, and as more Russian Far Easterners visited China.

In terms of activities carried out in Russia, Chinese visitors can be divided into the

following groups:

- **Tourists**

Tourists have generally been welcomed by Russian authorities since the 1980s. The problem is group tourist trips quickly started to be abused for shuttle trade and illegal employment. As a result, bilateral regulations for visa-free tourism and requirements about minimal number of people in such tourist groups were tightened. In the 2010s, bilateral management and logistic efforts boosted the number of Chinese tourists almost twofold.

- **Traders**

This category increased in importance in the 1990s. Some of them are shuttle traders. Some bought goods imported by companies and were often involved in schemes to evade duties. The Russian government, however, toughened conditions for goods imported by individuals. Consequently, in 2000 informal cross-border trade was carried out mainly by Chinese companies that resorted to using Russian citizens rather than Chinese borderlanders.

- **Agricultural workers**

The Chinese have a reputation for being an excellent agricultural workforce because Russian agricultural workers are generally considered to be heavy drinkers. However, perceptions of Chinese farm workers are controversial. Some are said to have abused harmful fertilizers to obtain more crops, leaving behind exhausted and contaminated soil. There is a trend of decreasing the number of Chinese agricultural workers in the Russian Far East.

- **Construction workers**

Construction workers are also considered to be a cheap and industrious workforce. The number of Chinese construction workers started to rise in the 2000s. However, recently because of the Russian economic crisis and the crisis in construction, the number of Chinese has started to decrease.

- **Students**

Students are a very interesting case. Students generally are welcomed by Russian universities. Russia is also willing to attract and to assimilate well-performing Chinese students. The problem is that Russian higher education is considered as the cheaper and easier option for those who failed to enter decent Chinese or Western universities. In many cases, even formally reputable Russian universities act as “diploma mills” for Chinese students who don’t even know Russian by the end of their studies. I have met many such Chinese students in Russia.

- **Loggers**

Loggers employed by Chinese-owned companies are also controversial. Such companies are typically negatively framed in Russian sources as non-transparent, predatory towards the environment, and involved in customs fraud.

## ● Law-breakers

The most frequent kind of violation is of immigration regulations. Also, there is some information about Chinese organized crime groups that are targeting fellow Chinese and being involved in gambling houses, brothels and extortion. Such criminals also cooperate with Russian organized crime and corrupt officials.

Alarmist sentiments were extremely widespread in the 1990s, but centralization and establishment of better relations with China softened them to some extent, but they are still here.

There are roughly three peaks to alarmist statements about Chinese made by Russian MPs of the State Duma (the lower house of parliament). The first peak is connected to a Russian decision to cede some islands to China during territorial settlements. The second peak is about Russian-Chinese agreements on development of the Far East, and the third peak is for facilitations of the visa regime for Chinese.

In Russia alarmism can be high and moderate. It can also be focused on current and on future trends. Most Russian scholars of China are not alarmist, or even moderate alarmist, regarding past and future trends. In the first half of the 1990s, Russian scholars of China frequently appeared in the media and significantly contributed to reducing or softening alarmist sentiments.

Here are some influential arguments regarding present alarmism. The first argument is that the actual number of Chinese is supposedly huge. In some settlements it is said to exceed the number of local inhabitants. However, there is no evidence confirming this statement. The fact that the Russian-Chinese border is heavily patrolled is important to remember.

The second argument is that Chinese tend to pursue short and long-term policies of “creeping occupation” of the Russian Far East. In China there are some maps in which Russian territories are marked as belonging to China. Nevertheless, there is no serious evidence of such malicious policy. Also, Russian-Chinese relations are good and China needs access to Russian raw materials rather than physical control over these territories.

The third argument is that Russian policies allow China to bring its workforce and take control of agricultural land. However, Russia needs this Chinese workforce to cultivate abandoned land.

Another argument is that Chinese immigration is harmful for economic and social reasons. For example, that Chinese immigration encourages criminals to enter Russia, and that agricultural and logging activities damage soil. However, the real problem is Russian authorities who fail to regulate these activities.

The second kind of alarmism is future-oriented. Alarmists of this kind, including some scholars, argue that the current situation is unproblematic but that things could change in the future. Such a change is especially likely if Russian-Chinese political relations worsen, or if the economic conditions in China deteriorate. Nevertheless, we

should remember that the Chinese population is aging and that recent Chinese policy is increasingly oriented towards internal consumption. Also important is that Chinese salaries are rising in comparison to Russian ones. These considerations will work to reduce labor immigration.

Now for a tongue-in-cheek look at some especially delirious statements by Russian politicians and experts about Chinese immigration. They include the following:

1. Russian girls who make love with Chinese boyfriends get venereal diseases that can't be cured with domestic drugs. Chinese are also immune to these drugs. Possibly such diseases were produced artificially to ensure the expansion of China.
2. Russia removed nuclear mines on the former Soviet-Chinese border. Now, Russia doesn't know what to do there. It is very difficult to constrain the growth of numerous ethnic immigrants across multiple checkpoints. A possible response following such logic - nuclear mines for checkpoints.
3. The census failed to detect 8 million Chinese immigrants, because a huge number of them are living in the forests.
4. An analysis by retired intelligence officers stated that there are 6.5 million Chinese people in Russia. Most supposedly entered Russia illegally despite the Russian border being heavily protected.
5. Finally, the government urgently needs to pay attention to what is happening in Siberia and the Far East. These territories are rapidly being populated by Chinese citizens. Many women in the Far Eastern region have two husbands: one Russian and one Chinese. The Russian one earns more money for the family, the Chinese one educates the children and does housework. Furthermore, many consider such relations normal. The author of this statement is Director of the Department of the Institute of Social Politics of the Russian Academy of Science.

My last point is about measures to counter Chinese immigration that have been discussed or implemented. Statements have been made about toughening the immigration regime, strictly observing quotas, and stopping shadow economic activities. Some argue that Chinese immigration should be facilitated. Advocates of facilitation argue that Russia badly needs a workforce so it should attract more Chinese immigrants. In particular, Russia should look to attract skilled immigrants and students. Russia should remove unnecessary bureaucratic barriers and do its best to become more attractive for Chinese immigrants. This approach is assimilation, and concerns educated people, specialists, and students. Russia should welcome these categories of immigrants while being restrictive to others. Another approach is counterbalancing. According to this view, Russia needs Chinese immigrants but it should also attract immigrants from other countries to counterbalance Chinese immigration. Lastly, there is bilateral cooperation which involves cooperating with China to regulate illegal immigration.

These are my conclusions. First, Russia's attractiveness for Chinese labor immigrants is decreasing because of the recent decline in the value of the Russian ruble. It is also decreasing because of restrictive trends in Russian immigration legislation. At the same time, the number of Chinese tourists is increasing. Second, China understands Russian concerns and fostering Chinese immigration to Russia is not a priority for Beijing. Third, although popular alarmists' sentiments against Chinese immigration in the post-Soviet period have tended to decrease, such feelings still exist. Ironically,

such sentiments are nearly inversely proportional to the number of Chinese actually coming to Russia. Therefore, alarmist sentiments were intense in the 1990s, but now they are probably at their lowest level. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese coming to Russia is actually increasing. Nevertheless, alarmist sentiments are fueled by poor transparency in Russian-Chinese cooperation in the context of Russia's eastern pivot. They are also encouraged by internal interests. For example, those who address the problem of resettlement of the Russian Far East cite Chinese expansion as one argument for why money should be given to them.

### **Discussant's comments**

**Jong Seok Park** (Kyushu University)

Regarding the first speaker's presentation I'd like to raise several small questions and one big one.

First, two small questions: What do you mean by the term "first marriage"? Marriage by who? Secondly, you describe the 'feminization of immigrants'. Do you think this is a new phenomenon, or not?

Secondly, my big question. I understand that your approach is strongly based on your sense of altruism or idealism about this topic. Overall, I agree with your attitude and approach, but I also feel some concerns about such an approach. There is a possibility of demonizing men seeking foreign brides in South Korea and Japan. Conversely, there might also be a possibility of victimizing female marriage migrants. I think such marriages are based on mutual interest and/or mutual consent. Your approach might fail to capture the harsh realities of human life. For example, you assume that human beings should not be treated as a commodity. I agree with this but isn't the essence of marriage basically about commoditification? For example, you explained about a South Korean man who married a Vietnamese woman after only knowing each other for a few hours. What does this mean? This is a negotiation and a transaction. I think we need to capture the harsh realities of human relationships. Only through such an understanding might we construct a better solution.

Now I will move on to the second presentation by Yuji Fukuhara and Mitsuhiro Mimura. Firstly, I appreciate your hard-earned information about North Korean workers in Mongolia. This kind of information is hard to get. As Yuji Fukuhara explained, he had to use special connections to get this kind of information.

Now my comments and questions. I have a comment about naming. In the paper, the authors simplified 'North Korea' to 'Korea'. If you use North Korea to describe Korea, and there is no reference to 'South Korea' then such a simplification is not a problem. However, the paper also refers to South Korea. Korea and South Korea are even used in the same sentence with Korea indicating North Korea. This is, I think, not so desirable.

Now for my first question. Do you feel some resistance in the response of Mongolian companies to the US pressure to send back North Korean workers, or not?

My second question is about the gap between the kind of workers Mongolian companies ask for, and the kind of workers North Korea provides. As you explained, Mongolian companies usually, want unskilled labor. However, the workers they receive are, in many cases, highly skilled. Where does this gap come from? Perhaps there are two reasons. One is North Korea's weak economic situation. Even professionals in North Korea might want to go to Mongolia as unskilled labor. Another reason might be North Korea's ideological concern.

My third question is why North Korea sends a smaller number of workers compared to the original agreement?

Lastly, my questions for Serghei Golunov. Firstly, why does Russia prevent Chinatowns from being formed? Secondly, aren't there some problems with the categories you used? Why is 'law-breakers' a separate category when the others are all mutually exclusive?

Finally, you described the response of Russia with the expressions "alarmism" and "utilitarianism". What's your own view about which of these terms is more accurate?

[Chi] Park-san, thank you for your questions and comments. Just quickly, the short question that you asked me, were you referring to the phrase "first marriage" — was that what you were asking? Ok, a certain percentage of men that marry foreign brides, their marriage is not the first marriage, it's the second marriage. Some have — referred to them as being undesirable men in their respective countries. So, sometimes the marriage — it's the first marriage for the foreign brides but it sometimes may be the second or third marriage for the Korean or the Japanese man. Also, your question about feminization of migration being a new phenomenon or not — women have been migrating for a very long time, but previously they would migrate as part of the family. Now, in East Asia, since the 1980s, women have been migrating on their own because there are gaps that have been created because of women in developed countries participating in the labor market. So, it is relatively new, I would say, in terms of these women filling these gaps for care and for domestic work, because now they have families with working moms and whatnot. Also, the question about the sending countries, now, there has been increased awareness and concern in Vietnam and also in the Philippines about their women's safety, so there are laws in Vietnam and the Philippines concerning brokerage. So, marriage brokerage is regulated in both countries. And since 2008 in Korea, Korea also has a brokerage law. And one of the laws is that the Korean brokerage company working in these two countries, they need to abide by local domestic laws, so there is concern, of course, within Korea and also within the sending countries.

The question about the re-victimization of these marriage migrants is a really important question, and I think Professor Ishii's question about agency. This is where we are kind of split. That is to say, we should recognize that these women have choices, and they have certain priorities and objectives. And marriage should be one of them. We should not consider it being a bad thing. But at the same time, when we

look at it that way, then sometimes we fail to actually see the dangers these women are facing. On the other hand, when we talk about these women being victims, and when we talk about these women being targets of modern-day human trafficking, then again, the question is, many of these women choose to come. Many of them are not even coming through a brokerage. For instance, one of the Filipino women married to a Korean man that I interviewed married her husband not through a brokerage, but as a friend, and they dated, and they decided to get married, and now they live in Korea, but people all around her are like, did you marry him because you wanted a visa? So, she is getting all these questions asked, and everyone's thinking that she must be one of the marriage migrants going through a brokerage, because she needed to get a visa to stay in Korea, but that's not necessarily the case for some women. So, it's a very important debate that we talk about all the time. We're not saying that one side is correct and the other is wrong, but there needs to be a balance because the important thing is to minimize the violation of human rights for these women.

[Mimura] Naming is problematic. Originally, my paper was written in Japanese so North Korea was "Joseon" and South Korean was "Hanguk". The translator rendered "Joseon" as Korea and "Hanguk" as South Korea. For the presentation I wrote North Korea as DPRK and South Korea as ROK. When we publish this paper, we will change the names appropriately.

As for US pressure I think, the economic benefit from the United States might be bigger than that of North Korean workers. As a result, Mongolia decided to listen to the US. I think it's a very simple reason. For small countries, listening to the United States or Russia or China is very important to get economic benefits. And also for national security it is very important.

About North Korean workers, I think that working outside the country is very popular. In North Korea they say that once you go to a foreign country and work for three years the inside of your apartment is luxurious. It has a TV and new tiles, etcetera. The second time you go there, all the clothes you wear are better. And the third time you go to a foreign country, then you will buy a new apartment. So, people who have more power than just a worker, are more likely to be chosen to go to foreign countries. This is because they have some money to bribe to officials. So, power is number one, and number two is ideological concern. However, basically, since the North Korean economic condition situation is bad they want to go abroad to work.

In response to your last question about why only a small number come it is because the condition of work is not high in Mongolia. I think working in Russia earns more money as a construction worker. That's why more don't choose Mongolia as a destination. In Russia, Sakhalin is the most popular destination because they can go outside if they move with a group of two or more. In other parts of Russia, they have to walk around in groups due to fears that they will try to defect. In Sakhalin, however, they cannot leave the island without passports. They are comparatively free, having leisure time and more room for earning extra money by working overtime or weekends.

[Golunov] Why are Russian authorities and a large number of experts against Chinatowns? There are probably two reasons: the first is that geopolitical alarmism

together with conspiracy theories is deeply rooted in Russian political discourse. There is a fear of the creeping occupation of Russian territories, so Chinatowns could become the first step for occupation of Russian territories according to those who adhere to such discourse. Also, some experts are against Chinatowns because they are afraid that Chinatowns will become enclaves. In reality, Chinatowns can be an efficient form to prevent social disorganization. The problem is that the Russian police are heavily corrupted. Furthermore, they probably can't be reformed efficiently under the current political regime.

Second, about the categorization of immigrants and law-breakers. This categorization is not intended to be academic. It is just for the purpose of a more convenient presentation.

Third, what is my opinion about choosing between alarmism and utilitarianism? First of all, I am not an alarmist. I am for more efficient regulation to prevent criminalization trends, diploma mills in Russian universities, and so on. But there is a problem with attracting immigrants — there are two main reasons: the first is that Chinese salaries have become higher than Russian ones and there is a trend of immigration of highly skilled Russian workers to China now. In the case of pilots, it is a very serious challenge for the Russian government this year. The second reason why it is difficult to attract Chinese immigrants is the anti-immigration crackdown policy of the Russian government. Last year, it even introduced the Russian language and fundamentals of Russian history and culture exam for almost all immigrants coming into Russia. For most Chinese it is very difficult to pass this exam.

[Question] My name is Akiko Sasaki, from the Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. Today's session title says 'Migration and refugees in Northeast Asia', so could tell me about the situation of refugees in Northeast Asia? When it comes to Northeast Asia, the 'refugee problem' doesn't ring a bell for me. For me, it's more like the Mediterranean areas or like the Rohingya in Myanmar.

[Chi] I'm not an expert, but I can give you a really simple and short answer to that question. It's difficult to label them as refugees, but we do have North Korean defectors that come to South Korea or to China, or sometimes they seek to go to a third country. I don't know very much about it. Maybe Professor Mimura or Professor Fukuhara knows better than me, but from my understanding, depending on where they end up, they're referred to as refugees or defectors. I know that in South Korea, when they do defect to South Korea, they are re-educated in this institution. There are quite a few problems, as I understand, in terms of these people once they leave the institution — it's called Hanawon. Once they leave the institution, they have a lot of problems getting jobs. This is because you can detect them by their accent so have problems integrating to South Korean society. I know that there are a couple of NGOs in Canada that help those North Korean refugees that sought to go to Canada. I know there's a big one in Toronto. I can't remember the exact name of it, but these people wait two to three years for refugee status once they reach Canada.

[Mimura] Thank you for the good question. If we look at other regions, in comparison Northeast Asia is relatively stable. In Northeast Asia states have high borders so there is 'defence' from migrants. In the future there might be a refugee issue coming from North Korea.

[Fukuhara] Yes, there are a lot of defectors and it's difficult to define the North Korean people; China treats them as illegal immigrants. That means they don't have passports and enter the territory of the People's Republic of China. The South Korean government says officially that the Chinese government should send all these people to South Korea. However, this is just an official stance. Actually, the South Korean government asks the Chinese government not to send any, because it is too much for them. My feeling is that some North Korean defectors are real refugees, politically, and some part of them are economic immigrants.

Because of the North Korean regime, however, if someone crosses the border to China, then it's very difficult for them to come back to North Korea. This is the case even if they later regret going to China because the working conditions are very bad. If a person goes back they would be arrested and sent to a camp for a year or two. As a result, definitions are difficult and the North Korean refugee problem is a deeply political one.

[Question] I have a question for Professors Mimura and Fukuhara. As far as I understand, these North Korean workers are working in private companies in Mongolia. But they are going to Mongolia based on the inter-governmental agreement. So, my question is how do they reach the employers?

[Fukuhara] A Mongolian company that needs a North Korean worker asks a labor agency for sending North Korean workers. That agency, if they gather the number of workers needed, then makes an application to receive North Korean workers to the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia. Then, the Mongolian Ministry of Labor contacts its North Korean counterpart. Next, inside North Korea they choose the workers and tell the Mongolian side who is coming. After that, the Mongolian Ministry of Labor tells the Embassy of Mongolia in Pyongyang to issue visas. Since there are no state-owned enterprises in Mongolia, all of the workers are working in private companies.

[Question] I have a question building on the earlier one about refugees. Because we are here in Japan, and it's my first visit here, I would be interested to hear a little bit about Japan and Northeast Asia's view on welcoming refugees from other regions. Has there been any discussion within the region, given the millions that are displaced internationally, that Japan, or other Northeast Asian countries, should be taking more refugees?

[Chi] Again, I am not an expert, but I can give you a simple and short answer to the question. I know that Japan has been criticized by various organizations and by the international community, for not accepting refugees. The Abe government has announced that they would be willing to take more. I know that there are three Syrian refugees that currently have refugee status in Japan. And there are also quite a few Rohingya people that have refugee status here in Japan. The Japanese government has a very strict definition of a refugee. Unless you can prove that your life is in danger, they are very hesitant to provide refugee status. I know that the Japanese government does offer a special residency for people that they feel are not in immediate danger, but who can be permitted to stay in Japan. It's not a refugee status, so they don't get any support from the government. It's a special residency or a status to live in Japan for humanitarian purposes. I know that the Korean government has also stated that they are willing to accept more refugees, but because they have the North Korean

defectors coming it is a problematic issue.

[Iwashita] Just a symbolic episode but a couple years ago, when we discussed the Syrian crisis and how we deal with the refugees, our Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, was asked his views. He replied that there was no problem because we Japanese can tackle the shortage of labor force by ourselves. It means that he sees refugees as a Japanese shortage of labor force issue. Many Japanese were astonished by his comments.

[Question] About the refugee situation in Northeast Asia, 10 days ago the Deputy Prime Minister of Japan (Aso Taro), said that there would be some refugees from North Korea who are armed. What kind of impact do you think such comments have on the mindset of Japanese people?

I also have a question about economic sanctions on North Korea. Are economic sanctions ineffective because many North Koreans work in China and Mongolia, and send back remittances to support the DPRK economy?

[Fukuhara] We need to consider if stricter enforcement of economic sanctions will lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. If the regime did collapse there would be millions of refugees and a humanitarian disaster. China is particularly concerned about such a possibility.

[Question] Can the three presenters explain how your papers connect with ‘security perspectives’ which is in the symposium title? I wasn’t entirely sure about the connection.

[Golunov] I think that this connection is prominent in my presentation. It connects with security perceptions which are related to the interests of some prominent actors. These actors put forward Chinese immigration as a security issue to domestic audiences in the Russian Far East. In some cases, raising such security questions legitimizes their power and gives them significant resources.

[Chi] In terms of a security perspective, I was asking that question myself. I have been thinking about this issue in terms of human security. In East Asia the population is aging and there aren’t enough young people to support the elderly. I don’t think we have any other option but to have people come from the outside. I mean, if we can’t find people on the inside, then we have to find them somewhere. Migration is becoming so politicized and if you look at some of these internet sites you see all sorts of these — just hate crimes. For instance, in Korea, they have people afraid that their children’s organs might be stolen by these Chinese nannies. All these sorts of things are real, and it’s being discussed on Facebook and so on. You can see that migration is being politicized, and there are people in danger because of these fake news and whatnot, and also the human rights violations too. I won’t say that law and institutions — they don’t solve the problem. I think we need more than that. That’s just the beginning. We need legal frameworks and institutions to prevent, as much as we can, the violations of human rights and whatnot, and illicit trafficking. But we also need people that are making these policies and implementing these policies, we need them to do a bit more, so in that sense, I think that in terms of those kinds of ideas, I think that my paper can be an approach to human security issues in Northeast Asia.

[Fukuhara] Well, it's a little bit difficult to connect this simple case with the security perspectives of Northeast Asia. But at the same time, it's workers working outside of North Korea, it's a part of economic sanctions these days, and it's keenly related to the North Korean nuclear development program. So, yes, in order to make a book or some brochure or something, yes, we have to add some part of that kind of security issues.

Anyway, what I want to say is that the small countries in Northeast Asia, they are doing their best to survive among the big powers like Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. The United States is not in Northeast Asia but they are eager to come to Northeast Asia and do something. If they do withdraw, we are very happy, I think, but anyway the United States is one of the stakeholders, so we have to write something about that.

[Iwashita] This is a question for Professor Golunov. As you know, since 2004, all of the boundary disputes between China and Russia are supposed to have been settled. But what do you think alarmists might think about the following point regarding China? In September 2017, I conducted a border tourism tour to Heixiazi, Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island. It was a problematic island dispute, but now it's cut in half according to the 50/50 formula. Half of the western part went to China. We traveled from the China side to the Russian side. The western part of the island is very developed for sightseeing. There are big tour groups, a big park - many Chinese tourists come. The Russian side is not so developed — just leaving it as it were. We discovered a new map in China and Russia. In Russia, it's a very honest map. Half of the island is depicted as the Chinese side. The new border was written on the middle line of the Heixiazi Dao, Bolshoi Ussuriysky. But in China, we were amazed. In China's new map, all of the island belongs to China with no line in the middle! On the western part, many sightseeing places were written, but the whole island was represented as still belonging to China. I think it's very provocative to Russian tourists to these places. I think it's also highly combustible fuel for the alarmists. They might say 'the Chinese, even after finalizing the dispute areas for ending all the disputes still have ambitions on the map'. What do you think of this in relation to the alarmist view in territorial disputes.

[Golunov] Alarmists argue that territorial disputes can be resurrected. Some of them even use the Crimean issue as an example for how the territorial disputes can lie dormant only to erupt later. This map issue is interesting and is one of the main arguments for alarmists. In the 1990s they argued that there are some maps in China that portray the Russian-Chinese border as it was before the 1860 Beijing treaty. They used this as proof that China still intended to make claims. It is also fascinating that there are multiple maps in China - so many versions and perceptions.

[Iwashita] To wrap up, migration studies are good because as scholars we have to think beyond regions. Today's presentations are in three categories: the first presenter introduced Japan and South Korea as an example of social and civic democratized societies' migration issues. The second presentation was a state-controlled case, which is one of the characteristics of Northeast Asia. Finally, the third presenter's paper about China and Russia gave a more 'in-between' perspective.

## **SESSION B: MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM SECURITY PERSPECTIVES**

### **Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: UNHCR and IOM Moving Beyond Their Mandates**

**Nina Hall** (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies - Europe)

It's wonderful to be here. Thank you very much to the organizers for inviting me. This is my first trip to Japan, and this is my first proper day here, so I am really delighted to be sharing it all with you. And it's a great pleasure to speak on climate change and migration with these other panelists, because together, the three of us will provide interesting and complementary views.

I'm curious to hear in the audience, as how many of you work, or research, or have studied issues related to climate change and migration? Any hands up? How many of you work on migration, specifically, or refugee issues, in the audience? Anyone? And climate change? Ok, that's useful. To give you a sense of the scholarship and the reports at the moment, we know that climate change is affecting millions of people worldwide. How do we know that? There are a number of reports that have come out, including the recently-released IMF World Economic Outlook, which warned that substantial migration flows, potentially spilling across country borders, could arise, if climate change leads to a significant rise in sea levels. And the IMF's World Economic Outlook, from a couple weeks ago which also predicted, on current global warming predictions, that hundreds of millions of people in low-lying areas could become vulnerable to flooding, forcing them to abandon their homes. A slightly older, from 2012, Asian Development Report, estimated that about 3.72 million people in India, 27 million in Bangladesh, 22.3 million in China, and 9.1 million in Japan, could be at risk from sea level rise. This report was not making the argument that all would be displaced, but that there are millions of people who are at risk in the Asian region.

Climate change, we know, poses a major challenge for developed, as well as developing countries. However, to give those of you in the room who are new to the subject of climate change and migration, it's actually very difficult to scientifically prove that climate change causes migration and displacement. And there are a few reasons for that. The first is proving scientifically that climate change has caused any particular natural disaster is hard. Scientific experts are currently researching how to do this. But what we can say is that climate change increases the frequency and severity of storms and cyclones, but it's difficult to attribute a particular instance, such as the typhoon that's currently about to hit Japan, to climate change. We know that there is an overall likelihood that with climate change we will see more extreme

weather events.

Secondly, even if we were able to prove that climate change caused a particular natural disaster, it is difficult to show that any particular natural disaster always causes migration or displacement. This is because, as scholars of migration studies will tell you, there are many different factors that lead to migration. Often, political and economic factors will have as important an impact as pure environmental. Take the Netherlands versus Bangladesh. They are both low-lying delta areas, extremely prone to floods. I was in the Netherlands last year and went to see the deltas, and they have these amazing engineered dykes and bridges, and can seal off entire rivers, to stop flooding. Now, the Netherlands has the money and the political will to invest a significant amount in civil defense. That's different for somewhere like Bangladesh, which doesn't necessarily have the same capacity, both financial and human resources, to adapt, or to prepare, for climate change. So, a flood in Bangladesh is much more likely to lead to displacement of peoples than a flood or a storm that hits the Netherlands.

Another important thing is that migration can also be viewed positively. Here I challenge a little bit the security framing, that migration caused by climate change is a problem. The International Organization for Migration, for instance, has outlined how migration is also a way that people cope, and have done so for centuries. We have people who are nomads, who in the Horn of Africa, move for their livelihoods. Similarly, as I'm sure John can attest to in the Pacific region, people have moved frequently around the Pacific, and so it shouldn't necessarily be seen as a problem or a threat when people move. There are obviously instances where migration is a challenge that states have to deal with, but it doesn't necessarily mean it's a security threat.

In sum, the links between climate change, migration, and displacement are complex, and much of the academic literature has been trying to tease out what these linkages are.

The second thing that I want to clarify before I get into my more substantive comments on my research is that it's actually incorrect to call somebody a climate refugee. Benoit will elaborate more on this from the legal perspective. The reason is that the 1951 Refugee Convention states very clearly who a refugee is, and it's only for somebody who flees, firstly, across an international border, and for reasons of persecution based on an individual's race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group.

So, if you are living in Haiti or Japan and there is a major earthquake and you flee your country because of that earthquake, you are not a refugee under that convention. And in fact, there was a case in New Zealand, which is where I am originally from, several years ago, where a Kiribati man pledged for refugee status in New Zealand — and I detail this in the paper — but was rejected. The New Zealand courts ruled that his claim, that his life, was threatened by heightened sea levels in Kiribati.

Kiribati is a low-lying atoll, which, we know, is facing increased wave heights, storm surges, hurricanes, and the sea water is also contaminating ground water, making it

very difficult for people to grow crops. However, this individual from Kiribati who was in New Zealand asked for asylum and was not granted asylum, because under the 1951 Refugee Convention, climate change related displacement does not make you a refugee.

Now, within this academic debate and scholarship, a lot of NGOs, even some academics, have been campaigning and saying that although the links might be difficult to prove between climate change and displacement, we know that millions of people are being affected, and they are not currently protected by refugee law, because they don't meet the refugee convention. So, there have been demands in the last 10 years for new categories of refugee status. Early on, people asked for a new convention on refugees. Now, there is a range of new proposals that people push for.

My research has been looking at how our existing international humanitarian and migration and refugee institutions have been responding to climate change. In my research, I ask how have our humanitarian institutions adapting to climate change? Particularly, given states designed these institutions after World War II to assist with the outbreak of war but not to respond to natural disasters. And I focus specifically on the United Nations High Commissioner responsible for Refugees, and the International Organization for Migration.

Today, I'm going to highlight some examples of how two organizations — the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have changed in a 10-year period from 2005 to 2015. I'll give you some of the highlights, and I recommend, if you are interested in knowing more, take a look at my book that came out last year on this topic.




Figure 1

In the book, I look at changes in rhetoric, how the heads of the organization talked about climate change. I also look at changes in policy, structure, whether they hire new climate change experts, operations and mandate.

The research that I'm presenting today is based on extensive primary research. I did interviews with over 100 NGOs, and staff of international organizations, states. I conducted those in New York, in Geneva, in Copenhagen at the Climate Summit, and also in Kenya, where I spent time at two refugee camps: one, Dadaab, which is on the border of Kenya, close to Somalia, and another, Kakuma, which is near the border with South Sudan. I'm happy to speak more broadly about this issue and the work they were doing there.

# UNHCR, Climate Change and Mandate Expansion



18/07/10

 **JOHNS HOPKINS**  
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UNHCR is the guardian of the Refugee Convention. They were established in 1951 to protect refugees, and they were originally an organization that was mostly made up of refugee lawyers, based in Geneva. They've now expanded, and also, as many of you know them, they run many refugee camps around the world. In the period I was studying, António Guterres was the High Commissioner. He's now the UN Secretary-General. When he was High Commissioner he outlined a very expansive role for UNHCR. Many refugee law experts would see it having a narrower role, just protecting refugees, but the High Commissioner thought that the agency should be responsible for all displaced peoples. And he argued that climate change was a new driver of displacement. He urged states to consider expanding the Refugee Convention, and to offer protection to those displaced by climate change. As he stated, "Even if they are not refugees, such people are entitled to our support and to have their voices heard and taken into account." So, over the course of about five years, he pushed member states and lobbied them to consider including climate change displacement as an area that UNHCR should have a mandate for. But most states rejected this idea. And we see this tension, most pronounced, in 2011, when they had a major 60th anniversary—the UNHCR, and in December of that year, they had a ministerial meeting. In the lead-up, UNHCR prepared a background paper and really said to states, consider the gaps in the protection framework where people who aren't refugees but are vulnerable, where we should be offering them assistance: what kind of new international legal frameworks should we develop? However, states were not supportive of expanding and giving UNHCR any new powers. First, some thought it was too early to talk about developing so-called soft law frameworks for climate change displacement. Soft law indicates that it's not necessarily like the Refugee

Convention, a hard-signed treaty, but just initial iterative recommendations. And many states expressed concern that UNHCR didn't have the capacity or the financial resources to expand. They felt that UNHCR was already overstretched as an agency, and couldn't help most refugees around the world. Their concern was that if UNHCR added new categories of people to its protection mandate, it wouldn't be able to assist refugees sufficiently. So, UNHCR's attempt to expand its mandate was rejected.

But five states, in 2015, did pledge to develop a new framework. They were Argentina, Germany, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland. And the Norwegians have been particularly active in trying to find ways to develop new soft-law frameworks, new guidelines and principles, to assist people displaced by climate change and natural disasters. In fact, after 2011, Norway helped launch the Nansen Framework. It was named after a Norwegian, Fridtjof Nansen, who was an early scientist, explorer, and humanitarian. The Nansen Initiative was set-up as a small secretariat of states, based in Geneva, and supported by UNHCR, to discuss climate change and displacement. They ran a number of regional consultations, some in the Pacific, and others around the world. And at the end of it, in 2015, they issued a non-binding document — now, it's important that it is non-binding, because states don't want to sign up to any new binding documents. This was the agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced peoples in the context of disasters and climate change. UNHCR's work, as you can see, continues in this area. They are also working alongside the international platform on disaster and displacement.

So, the short story is that UNHCR tried and failed to expand its mandate, but there are initiatives where it is working with states to try and assist people affected by climate change.

## IOM, Climate Change and Mandate Expansion



IOM is a shorter story. William Lacy Swing, who is currently the director-general, had much more success at getting states support to work on climate change and migration. IOM was created also in the 1950s to work on facilitating and helping states with migration, but they did not have any mandate to protect migrants' rights. They are different from UNHCR. They are more like a service provider to states. They rarely criticize states. States are less worried about adding to its mandate, as it is unlikely to have major implications for the way states manage their migration policies. When IOM said we need to address the links between climate change and migration, states were initially a bit tentative to do so. But then by 2010, they agreed that it was in IOM's strategic interest to address new challenges like climate change. and supported IOM to elevate climate change into its strategic review. We see a difference between IOM, which gained member state support to work on climate change and migration, mostly in terms of writing reports, working in particular programs, and UNHCR, were states didn't endorse mandate expansion.

Now, that's all at the institutional headquarters level. What about what they are actually doing on the ground? What you see with UNHCR and IOM is that they are both actively engaged in humanitarian operations and responding to natural disasters. So, humanitarian operations might be a result of conflict, but also a result of natural disasters. UNHCR in February, for instance, of 2013, was operating in Indonesia, the South Pacific, and two out of eight natural disaster emergencies in which the UN humanitarian cluster system had been activated. And they continued to be involved in humanitarian response to natural disasters. And their response and involvement tend to be based on whether or not they already have an established presence in a country in which a disaster strikes, and also based on whether or not they've had an invitation from a disaster-affected country. So, if Bangladesh or Burma invited UNHCR to be involved, then they are much more likely to say yes, but if they haven't been invited by a country, they are less likely to do so.

Similarly, IOM has also expanded into humanitarian assistance. It works, very actively, as a co-leader of the camp management and camp coordination cluster. For instance, when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, IOM brought in over 40 international specialists and increased national capacity to 50 staff members, opened up new sub-offices. They've written up a comprehensive guide for planning mass evacuations in natural disasters and have received requests from governments for assistance with evacuation plans. IOM works actively in trying to support and help governments deal with natural disasters. They worked in the Caribbean after Hurricane Irma. They deployed a search team of six experts, and they are often collating information on displacement and human mobility after disasters. The key distinction is that both organizations are very actively involved in humanitarian responses: IOM as a leader of the camp management and camp coordination cluster. UNHCR has a slightly different role around protection.

In conclusion, it is interesting to think about is why there is this difference. Why is it that IOM was able to convince states to elevate climate change in their strategic review but not UNHCR? I suggest in both cases international bureaucrats, i.e. the staff of the organizations, pushed for their member states to acknowledge the links between climate change and migration. And my book examines why then in the case of IOM, it was much easier to expand the mandate. And as I've alluded to in this talk,

it was because UNHCR has a very special status as an international organization. It is the guardian or has supervisory status over the Refugee Convention, and states, as we can see in this day and age, are very nervous about guaranteeing any additional rights to new groups of people. They are nervous about giving UNHCR protection responsibilities for any additional groups of people. But regardless of this lack of state support, UNHCR has expanded, and continued to work with people affected by climate change.

In rounding up, I was asked to be somewhat provocative, and to give some recommendations and thoughts about what states or other actors might be able to do. I want to note that there are multiple forums through which states or NGOs can push and consider how people affected by climate change and displacement might be provided with assistance. There's a couple that I want to mention: first of all, the Global Compacts. There are two new processes, as of last year, where the UN General Assembly has come together to try and identify new ways forward for both migrants and refugees, and develop – probably not binding frameworks – but potentially new soft law. Japan is in a particularly strong position to give input into this, because the United Nations University based in Tokyo is facilitating the global compact on migration.

There is also another way that states can, particularly in the Japanese context, address displacement – by accepting more Convention refugees. There is obviously a real problem, as we saw in the morning session, with UNHCR taking very few refugees. As I understand, in 2014, Japan accepted just 11 refugees out of a record 5,000. Japan has a good reputation of funding UNHCR but then hosts very few refugees. Given the number of refugees worldwide, I think this is something that could really change.

And thirdly, and my last point here, is that states can also pave a visionary way forward. They can outline new domestic interpretations of international refugee law. In fact, just last week, in New Zealand, we had a new government officially take office, under a Labour leader, Jacinda Ardern. Jacinda is a 37-year old woman, a first-time prime minister, and she, in her campaign, endorsed the idea of New Zealand offering protection to Pacific climate refugees. We are yet to see whether or not New Zealand will adopt any new policies or legal frameworks, but it's an example of how a country can decide on its own to take a step forward.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. Ok, then, very quick, burning questions, if you have any.

[Question] Thank you, everyone. I'm from Bangladesh. My country's main problem is the population. It's a densely populated country in the world — I think around 27 million people. And that's why my country is so much in industrial development now to support their economy. And industrial owners can get easily manpower to spend a small amount of money. So, that's why they increase, and develop, their industrialization. And in the world ranking, our capacity — the capacity of Bangladesh has become five-ranked in the populated areas of the world. So, my question is, is there any normative issue to solve or to protect this problem? Because our government mainly works to shift industrial areas to other areas. I think that is not any kind of solution to this problem. And our country has so much lowland area.

It's level, around sea-level, so that's why it faces many kinds of environmental issues like floods and other things. So, our government cannot decide how it can solve it. My question is, is there any normative issue to solve this population and industrialization problem?

[Hall] So, when you say normative, what do you mean?

[Question] Normative means is there any idealization to protect this problem? Or to solve this problem?

[Hall] Specifically, for Bangladesh, I think this is a good conversation, maybe, for the whole group to have, but a quick response is it's very difficult in the case of Bangladesh if you have so many people and you have low-lying areas. Around adaptation, there are a lot of very good engineering or technical things that the country can do to try and protect flooded areas and to adapt, and in the Netherlands, for instance, they're thinking about that a lot, but it doesn't solve the population issue. You're completely right. I am not a specialist in Bangladesh, so I don't want to say, here's the policy that you should implement. I think it's very difficult for a country with that many people, so it does rely on being creative about finding ways to assist people in areas that may be at risk, and that will require more than just the Bangladeshi government. I would argue it would also require outside support. But that's just an initial reflection. It's not something I have worked or written on, and I would invite others to also comment, maybe, in the second, later, part of our discussion.

## **Climate and Migration in Oceania**

**John Campbell** (University of Waikato)

Thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me to come and to make this presentation here. I'm going to be talking about a group of countries that are often referred to as the first victims of climate change. It's not a term I like very much. One of the important things that we have to remember is that people in Pacific islands have capacity, they have resilience, and we don't want to undermine that when we talk about them being vulnerable all the time. Nevertheless, changes are taking place globally to the environment that are placing a number of Pacific island places at risk.

Before I start, I'd like to talk about two kinds of migration that are linked to climate change. The first is what's often referred to as "induced migration." This is where the environment of a place becomes less able to support its people. It doesn't mean that it cannot support all of the people, but it will be less able. And in those circumstances, people might choose to migrate. As Nina mentioned, migration can be a positive thing, and migration is one form of adapting to climate change. So, that kind of migration will be like the migration that we already have in the Pacific. For example, there are several hundred thousand Pacific island people living in New Zealand who have chosen to migrate for economic and for family purposes, over the last 20-30-40 years.

And the second kind, I refer to as "forced relocation." This will happen when a place is no longer able to support its population. Either the land on which they live disappears, which may happen because of sea level rise, or because they can no longer have livelihoods that are sufficient to support them, or if the place becomes dangerous to live in, because of increased disasters or changes in disease patterns such as, for example, malaria spreading to islands that don't, at present, have malaria. So, we call that "forced relocation" and that is when a whole community would have to leave and go from one place to another.

So, some of the reasons, then, are loss of land security, loss of livelihood security, and loss of habitat security. Or any combination of those, And there are a series of possible scenarios in the Pacific islands. Atolls, which are very low-lying — Nina showed a photograph of one in Kiritimati — may become uninhabitable through erosion, water shortages, and food shortages. And, people can no longer live on them. In many Pacific island countries, most people live near the coast, right on the coast. That's where they have their villages. And many coastal locations will similarly become uninhabitable. But also in the Pacific, there are people who live in river valleys and river flood plains, particularly on the large islands of Melanesia. These are the islands that are formed through the same geological processes as Japan, through subduction. So, you get large mountains, river systems, and some very fertile areas. With climate change, it's likely that flood events will increase in frequency and magnitude. So, some of those areas won't be inhabitable. Another area is deltas, particularly, again, in those larger islands of Melanesia and the western part of the Pacific. They are densely

populated, because the soils are very fertile, and there is a lot of marine life that can be obtained for food and economic benefit. And finally, there are areas subject to successive droughts of high magnitude, another possible climate change scenario.

Normally, people just focus on sea level rise, but there is much more to it than that.

Now, here are some estimates of atoll populations for the Pacific (Figure 1). So, just looking at the one group, and here we can see: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau, and Tuvalu. They are four countries or territories that are made up only of atolls. They don't have any high land. Well, there is one in Kiribati, an island called Banaba, but people can't live there because it has been used to mine phosphate. So, these four countries are countries that see themselves, perhaps, as being most at risk.

And here is the summary: projected populations of the four atoll countries, Pacific island countries and territories — by mid-century, they will be around 283,000 people (Figure 2). And we can add another 67,000 people who live on atolls in other Pacific island countries. Those people have the possibility of going to some high land in their own country, but the people in atoll only countries don't have that opportunity.

So that's one group of people who might become climate migrants or forced relocated people. The second group are the coastal communities, and here, I've just done some simple calculations. We took 1% of the total population of the region, and, in most countries, about 75% of the people live on the coast. So, these are very conservative estimates. Papua New Guinea is an exception where a lot of people live inland, and they are by far the largest country in the Pacific Island region. So, if I only include 1% of Papua New Guinea, but 5% of the other countries, then we get up to 365,000 people possibly affected by mid-century, and then if we take 10%, it would be as many as 580,000. So, it just gives you an idea of the order of magnitude. Not all of these people may be forced to migrate, but at least it gives us an idea of the kinds of numbers of people we might be considering.

And then again, if we do the same sort of thing with people living on river flood plains and deltas, we could have between 180,000-900,000 people whose livelihoods, their land security, or their habitat security, is placed at risk. So, these are the people from whom initial migrants might be drawn from.

And drought, the most drought-prone place in the Pacific region is the highlands of Papua New Guinea, which has a population of about 2.8 million people (Figure 3). Papua New Guinea accounts for about 90% of the Pacific population. So, it dominates. Now, in the past, during major droughts, there has been significant migration to the urban areas. And the response which policy dates back to the time of the Australian colonization was to provide food relief to people in the highlands to stop that migration. Now, if these droughts become more frequent or more intense, then those pressures are going to increase.

So, we can look at possibly the number of people affected by the change that might become migrants (Figure 4). It could be anywhere up to 1.8 million people by mid-century. Now, that's just a broad estimate. It's not rigorous, but it's a kind of back-of-the-envelope calculation. And that excludes people affected by droughts, so that is a kind of idea of the magnitude. Now, compared to Bangladesh, that's nothing, but for

the Pacific island region, that's a lot of people.

Now, one thing I want to talk about briefly is the role of land in Pacific island countries. In most Pacific island countries, 95% of land is held in customary ownership. You can only inherit land through your kinship connections, through your mother or your father, or through marriage – you cannot sell it, and you cannot buy it. For Pacific island people, the land is so special that people think that they are part of it, and the land is part of them. They can't be separated. So, if they are forced to migrate or relocate, then that's a major psychological and cultural problem. Just migration is okay if you know you can get on a plane one day and fly back, but it's not so good if you've got to go away and can never go back. That is a major problem. So, these are issues that really affect and concern Pacific island people. Just to give you an example, in many parts of the Pacific, the word for land (fonua) is the same as the word for placenta, which nourishes the baby. And when people are born, quite often the placenta is buried in that land. And when you die, you get buried in that same land. So, the link between the people and the land is very, very strong. So, climate change has big implications for this particular relationship. In Fiji, the word "vanua" is the same as the Polynesian term "fonua." "People cannot live without their embodiment in terms of their land, upon which survival of individuals and groups depends. It provides nourishment, shelter, and protection, as well as security, and the material basis for identity and belonging. Land, in this sense, is thus an extension of the self, and conversely, the people are an extension of the land" (Ravuvu, 1988, p7). So, climate change poses a large, and we could say existential, threat, to Pacific island people, because if they lose their land, then they, in a sense, lose themselves.

So, then if people are forced to migrate or choose to migrate, where will they go? Well, there's a range of scenarios. They may, for a start, go somewhere else within their customary lands. And that's not uncommon, and it's easy to do, because you don't have to exchange land with anybody. It belongs to your clan or your tribe, and that is the best (Figure 5).

The second would be to go somewhere else near your village, but onto someone else's land. And that is very hard, because if you talk to Pacific island people, they would say I would like to help, but I can't, because I don't own the land. The land belonged to my forefathers and it will belong to my grandchildren and their great-grandchildren. So, I can't give it away to someone else. So, that becomes a major problem. Or, people, who will probably be the most common, will go to urban areas, where they will become squatters on land that belongs to someone else, and typically in squatter settlements, the title is insecure, and the buildings are more temporary, so they are actually highly at risk from things like tropical cyclones and so forth. And then you've got the solution of going outside of your own country, and that's when you get the international migration of climate-affected people, either those who are induced to migrate to look for work, so they can send some money home to help out those who stay in the degraded environment, or also, by leaving, they reduce the pressure on them. Or the ones who are forced to leave because the environment just won't support them at all. So, a lot of people say that the best solution for people from the atolls would be going to another Pacific country. The cultures are more similar, the climate is similar, and a lot of people agree with that. The Pacific council of churches has made the same statement, and that is very interesting, because traditionally, in the

Pacific, most people are very devout Christians, and there is a strong belief throughout the region that climate change won't happen, because God made a covenant with Noah that there will be no more flooding. And people accept that, and that was a big barrier to get people to take climate change seriously. But now the Pacific council of churches has accepted climate change, and things are changing in that regard.

And the final destination is beyond Pacific island countries, where you'll have to buy some land and live in that country. So, these are the range of options. And then, where to specifically? Well, the people from the atolls can go to towns or high islands, if they have any, and four of those countries don't. The coastal people can go inland away from the sea, or to town, to the cities, and the river flood plain people could do the same thing. But they would probably have to go to somebody else's land, and that will be very, very difficult.

The international options, well, the atoll countries can go to other Pacific higher island countries, like Fiji. There are some precedents where that has happened, where people have gone to relocate somewhere else. One group from Kiribati went to the Solomon Islands decades ago, still struggles to get accepted. When they had the tsunami and earthquake in the Solomon Islands, in 2007, I think, among the people who were worst affected were the people from Kiribati, even though they had been there for a couple of generations, because they couldn't get land on which to build a village, so they all lived down near the coast, and their villages were the most badly affected.

The other group went from Banaba, the phosphate island, to live on an island called Rabi, in Fiji. Now, Rabi is much more fertile than Banaba was, but the Fijian owners still want it back. And this is something that has gone on for generations and hasn't changed. And the third one was from an island called Vaitupu, in Tuvalu. They went to a small island in Fiji called Kioa, and that's been reasonably successful. But there's still a big group of people living in Vaitupu, still, so a person from that island of Kioa could always go home to his or her land.

Atoll countries and territories can go to their previous colonial countries. So, for example, if you were from Kiribati, well you could say, we were colonized by the United Kingdom. Surely that have some responsibility to look after us. Maybe we could go there. Former and current colonial countries include Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA.

The UK is an interesting one, because it is very quiet. It doesn't say anything about taking "climate change refugees", even though the countries most affected, Tuvalu and Kiribati, were both British colonies.

The country that's most often mentioned is New Zealand. All of the islands in Micronesia are linked in one way or another to the United States, and they all have migration access to the United States. So, that's not such a big issue, but right now, the state of Hawaii is making a claim against the federal government because of the high cost of Micronesian migration to the state of Hawaii for health and education. So, they are bearing the costs of that arrangement. Australia was previously a colonist of Papua New Guinea, and France still has its colonies of French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. And those people can go to France, I believe, if

they wish. And then the next option would be to go to Pacific Rim countries, even if they don't have a colonial connection, and I listed New Zealand, Australia, the USA, and others, and I should have perhaps put Japan there, because Japan is a Pacific Rim country and is close to the region. In fact, it has a colonial background in Micronesia, and a lot of Micronesian people have Japanese surnames and Japanese ancestry. So, there is a possible linkage there that could be considered.

Just very briefly, the cost of community relocation gets more and more the further you go. The slide (Figure 6) illustrates the various borders that need to be crossed. These are not just international but are more notional borders. The further you go from your traditional lands, the more difficult is the relocation, some of which will be unsuccessful adaptation. How can a community, for example, from Kiribati, be shifted, as a whole community, to live in New Zealand or Japan and sustain their traditional way of life? It would be impossible. For example, New Zealand has very strict fishing laws. So, what happens to the Kiribati people who want to go fishing, which is what they do every day? So, I think this would be a real problem. And then finally, community relocation is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and costs increase with distance. There is an issue of who should pay for this relocation. Who should pay for the air tickets? Who should pay for the costs of actually going to live in another country? Should this be part of the climate change adaptation funding? Now, that's a big issue. Recently we have discussions in relation to the Paris Agreement, of conference of the parties to the UNFCCC on the issue of loss and damage. And that is the idea that people who are suffering the most from climate change would have some kind of compensation. And clearly, places like Bangladesh, and in our case, Pacific island countries have a real case to make a claim. But one of the problems is that there is no dollar value you can place on land.

Okay, and very quickly, there are long-term costs. Tensions over land do not go away. Getting water uphill — if you move your village uphill, who gets the water up to your village now? Usually it's the job of the women, and in our studies of communities where they have relocated up-slope, the women complain that they have a life sentence carrying water. The sense of loss, international relocation is extremely difficult and it's possible that communities may disintegrate and there will be a loss of culture. And then long-term dialog is needed; you have to start talking now between communities who might be hosts to the migrants and the forced relocation people, and finally there is the issue of who is going to pay.

Arigato-gozaimasu.




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 6

## **The Climate-Migration Nexus: An International Law Perspective**

**Benoit Mayer** (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Thank you very much for having me here, as well. It's a pleasure. I've learned a lot this morning and this afternoon, and it's a huge responsibility to be the last speaker before the comments today. Some of what I wanted to say today has already been said, but I think that I have a few meaningful things to add, so I'm going to speak about the international law perspective. What can international law do to address this issue that Nina and John have explained before?

I will start with some general observations. The first is that climate is changing. Obviously, this has far-reaching impacts on human societies. These impacts are often indirect, which means that people are not generally affected directly by climate change. It's not that climate change knocks at your door and you are affected. It's a bit more indirect. Very often, the physical impacts of climate change affect economies, societies, and then individuals in very indirect ways. So, many people are affected by climate change without knowing it, because it is very indirect.

Secondly, these impacts are not necessarily of a new kind, by which I mean that the way you are affected by climate change is not necessarily something that never happened before in a way not connected to climate change. So, a lot of the migration we are talking about actually resembles a lot to scenarios of migration that existed before climate change, and will co-exist without climate change. You may have more people migrating. You may have more forced migrants, and more people in need of relocation — so, you have additional impact, additional suffering, but you don't necessarily have a different kind of suffering induced by climate change.

And the last general observation to which I will come back in the presentation is that climate change may help to open our eyes to some issues that the world had before, sometimes for very long, issues of lack of protection to forced migrants, from which they will cause an issue of lack of solidarity between nations and so on. These issues are not new, but they get a new prominence, a new political prominence, in the context of climate change.

I don't speak about climate migration in my research. I speak about the climate migration nexus, to avoid giving the impression that climate change migration is a distinct phenomenon. I believe it is a more complex relationship. I believe that climate change has diverse, often indirect impacts on human migration. So again, climate change will impact societies and economies and then individuals will be affected in most cases. Then, this migration can occur within states or across borders. Most of the impacts of climate change will induce people to migrate a relatively short distance. International migration is the exception, not the rule, and generally it is limited to the neighboring countries. It is quite rare that people affected by climate change have the resources to go to a different country, to fly say to the UK, on their own, if they don't have some sort of institutional support. And the last point here is that it is generally

impossible to attribute individual migrants to climate change — “climate migrants”, because migration, as John has mentioned before, is usually caused by a cluster of causes, and this is illustrated in the next slide (Figure 1), where you can see the kind of indirect relation between, on the top left, climate change increased concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The weather events, the physical impacts, of climate change on the right and then you have these kinds of disasters inducing vulnerability, inducing migration, which, in turn, induces vulnerability, which, in turn, can induce migration. This is kind of simplified. You can imagine more complicated, maybe different, kind of scenarios. But this is an illustration of the kind of indirect causation between climate change and migration, and the interaction with other causes, social, economic, political, and demographic factors. And we had an interesting question from Bangladesh before. Bangladesh obviously has at least a demographic factor very much prominent in inducing internal migration. I’m not going to speak about political circumstances which are still not very stable in Bangladesh. It is clearly an economic issue as well. So, all of these factors interact. It is not climate change directly causing migration.

I’m going to speak briefly about field work I did in Mongolia about the migration of herders towards Ulan Bator. This is a relatively important trend of migration in Mongolia. This is affecting about 10-20% of the population over 20 years. So, people herding, having some goats or sheep in the countryside, are generally affected by a combination of drought and snowfall. The drought is quite clearly related to an increase in temperature, which is quite good news, apparently, in Mongolia, but bad news for the sheep and the goats. So, there is less grass. And then, snowfall, because the precipitation doesn’t occur at the same time as it used to. Precipitation used to be mostly in the summer, and now there is a bit more snowfall, which didn’t previously occur in Mongolia. When you have any kind of snow, even a few centimeters, goats and sheep cannot eat grass, and then they cannot keep warm, and then they die. This is called a “dzud” — that’s the name for this kind of composite disaster that occurs in Mongolia, that has occurred much more frequently in recent years — not every year, but every five, six or seven years. And an important one was in 1999, in the winter between 1999-2000, where about 30% of the livestock died. So that’s, of course, huge implications for the economy and for the herders. Many of those lose everything and have no choice but to try to find a job in the town, which is Ulan Bator. So, there is a climate cause, if you will, but there are also a lot of different elements, which my field work was trying to understand by asking different stakeholders what would be the cause of migration.

So there is clearly an economic pull of Ulan Bator, which is developing much faster than the countryside. There is a relation with development policies. The new Mongolian government, since 1990, has invested mostly in Ulan Bator, and mostly in the mines, but not really in agriculture.

There is a social factor, the fact that all education, of course, is in Ulan Bator, and the gap has increased since 1990, and there is clearly a cultural representation as well. Herders now have satellite dishes, and they can watch TV, and they have this impression that everything has to be in Ulan Bator, when they have to leave their traditional way of life. So, there are many different factors interacting, and also in some political discourses, migration would be attributed to climate change, to get

some funding, for instance, but there are also other causes that interact.

So, this debate about the climate change-migration nexus is revealing some gaps in protection: the fact that when a government is unable to protect internal or international migrants, there is not really a safety net or any sort of legal protection or status, with the exception of refugees. But refugees are 16 million international migrants of about 200-300 million in the world, so that's a minority of the international migrants. Most international or internal migrants just depend on the good will of the state under which territory they are to protect them, and on the resources of this government.

And this protection gap is not a new gap. It's just a gap which has become more prominent because of the impacts of climate change.

Then I will look at the three different fields of international law interacting to address this issue. One is environmental and climate law. Then I will look at refugee migration and human rights law. So, the first is about the environment and the climate, whereas the second is about the people. And finally I will look at how these two fields have led to some developments with regard to migration in the context of climate change.

In terms of environmental and climate law, there is, I believe, an obligation (Figure 2) of every state under international law, not to cause serious harm to another state. So, there are some historical cases between Canada and the US about a plant in the Canadian province of British Columbia affecting the territory of the US state of Washington, where an arbitration panel said that Canada had the obligation to prevent activity within its territory from affecting a different state. And this clearly, from my perspective, applies to climate change, so I believe that under this principle there is an obligation for every developed country which has the resources to do so, to try to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. To implement this principle, there have been negotiations leading to the UN Framework on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancun Pledges, and most recently, the Paris Agreement. States have constantly agreed that what they had agreed on in negotiations was insufficient. For instance, there is no denial that the Paris Agreement, while useful, is not sufficient to prevent dangerous climate change. Negotiations have gone some way, but they are far from sufficient to implement general principles of international law.

And there are arguments not just about trying to reduce climate change, to mitigate, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. There are also arguments about responsibilities and compensation. If you breach an obligation and cause damage to a third party, you have to pay damages. If a state does not respect its obligation not to cause harm to another state, then they may have some responsibility.

This has been discussed mostly under the framework convention on climate change. There has been discussion about adaptation to climate change since 1992, and about a concept of loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change in developing countries, increasing prominence starting in 2007, and within this topic, there has been increasing discussions about migration.

Then, I turn to the other kind of field of law, which is about refugee migration and human rights law, which is about the protection of individuals (Figure 3). Here,

there is a much longer tradition of international law trying to force states to protect individuals. It starts with the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was followed by two treaties in 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — so, two covenants covering different fields of human rights law, and most recently, the 1990 convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers, and members of their families.

However, there has been very little political support for the application of these first two documents to migrants, and for the ratification of the last document. The 1990 Convention on Migrant Workers has mostly been ratified by countries which send migrant workers, and not by countries which receive them, and it was the longest UN human rights treaty to enter into force after about 15 years.

Then there's the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, which in 1951 was negotiated and ratified in order to manage the stock of refugees that were in different countries in Europe. It was only applicable to Europe, and it was only applicable to people who had already been displaced during the war. This was not really seen as a general framework on refugee law. It was extended by the 1957 protocol, to become universal, but it is still very much limited by the definition of Article 1A, according to which it only protects people who are persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. That means that anyone forced to migrate to a different country, or unable to return to their home country, because of anything else done — persecution, for any other than one of these five reasons, cannot be protected. So, this is a very, very narrow definition. And then you have some soft laws and interpretative documents speaking about internal displacement, which try to push states, incentivize states, to apply human rights law to internally displaced persons, with limited success. It has been reproduced in many domestic legislation, but usually not implemented on the ground.

There have been discussions about a possibility of a convention on climate refugees, which I don't really see the point of, because there is no specific category of climate change refugees. People are being displaced for a variety of reasons, and I believe that if you want to protect — if you are able to extend the protection of forced migrants, this shouldn't be limited to migrants which can be attributed to a particular cause. We should look at the need for protection, not to the cause of migration. So, there is no reason to limit this to climate refugees. I believe there is an even more interesting proposal by Alexander Betts, in Oxford, for the protection of “survival migrants,” that would extend to people forced to migrate because of poverty, because of malnutrition, or a variety of other compelling reasons.

Then there have been some discussions about what to do with the climate-migration nexus (Figure 4). There have been some mentions of migration under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, under the Doha discussions, there was some damage, and in the decision adopting the Paris Agreement, a coordination facility has been established. It's not really sure what it will do, if anything, except for exchanging good practices. The objective of developing countries pushing for this coordination facility was to get some funding, but funding seems to be excluded from the negotiations at present. So, there has always been some plans for funding for assistance on the part

of developing countries, and developed countries have only agreed to provide some forums to exchange good practices and to look at what we can do, but really without committing any international funding.

There is some allusion to displacement in the Sendai Framework for disaster reduction. And, as Nina mentioned, there is the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-induced Cross-Border Displacement. That actually kind of supports my claim that you shouldn't really focus on climate migration, because the negotiations started in 2011, with a conference on climate migration and then, over the 3-4 years of the process, turned to cross-border disaster-induced migration in the context of climate change, because the negotiators, the stakeholders, realized that it was very difficult to try to attribute migration to climate change, and this was not really the point. The point was to protect people in need of protection, not to try to make new categories of migrants based on considerations not directly relevant to their protection needs.

This initiative has been prolonged by the platform on disaster displacement, and at the moment, this is limited to, again, some exchange of good practices, some agenda setting meetings, but without any really legal implications, and it's a question of whether the states are actually willing to create some international obligations, or even transfer some funding on these issues.

Then, I believe the current debate on the climate-migration nexus actually has three different main arguments: one is about the protection of — one is about the climate change issue, trying to reduce climate change to address the consequences, and in this discourse, migration is seen as some kind of symbol of the impact of climate change. We have to do something, otherwise we have these floods of climate refugees. And this promotes a very alarmist discourse, which often relies on very strong numbers of millions of climate refugees, which have really no backing, I believe, in migration studies.

Then there is a different discourse which comes from human rights and migration studies, which is much more nuanced, which explains that we can't really attribute any migrant to climate change, but we have protected these very big numbers of forced migrants. We have to do something to make sure that people migrating within Bangladesh get some protection and their dignity is protected, but here there is not clearly any relation to climate change, just an awareness that climate change makes the issue bigger.

And then there is a third kind of argument, which is about security. And this is an argument that we tend to forget in the academic circles, because there are not really representatives of this kind of discourse in the research community, or not in the same kind of research communities. But there is a general feeling in many societies that receiving a lot of migrants is a risk, is a security threat, for the receiving country. We can agree or not with this, but that's an argument which is present in many places. These three arguments interact in many complex ways, and that's why I believe that if we turn to the first argument about this alarmist discourse on the flood of climate refugees, there is a risk that this will actually amplify the third argument, the fears of migrants, and this can actually be very counter-productive. So, I would call for a lot of attention, a lot of caution, in this kind of alarmist argument. I believe alarmism can be

very counter-productive in this argumentative area.

So, just the conclusion: is there any solution in sight? I believe that the solution is not to make it short. It's not necessarily specific to climate migration. I believe a solution is a better protection of all migrants, and this might be what the global compact on migration is doing: trying to find a solution for the inequality in the right of moving from country to country. For me, going to Japan was quite easy, but for many people, going to the next town may be quite difficult. So, there is a huge inequality, which is new in history, which has not always been the case, in the possibility of migrating from one place to another. And it's really something that, I think, is at the core of the issue, that this concept of climate migration is showing. So, we shouldn't look at the finger, which is the climate migration. We should look at what it points to, which is a much bigger issue of protecting the rights of migrants.

Thank you very much.




Figure 1

# 1. Environment and climate law

- Obligation of States not to cause serious transboundary environmental harm
- Treaty regime established by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
  - Kyoto Protocol
  - Cancún pledges
  - Paris Agreement
- Arguments on responsibility and compensation
  - Adaptation to climate change
  - Loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change

Figure 2

# 2. Refugee, migration and human rights law

- International protection of human rights
  - 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  - 1966 Covenants on Economic, Social and Political Rights, and on Civil and Political Rights
  - 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
- 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees
  - Condition: “persecute[ion] for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”
- Debates on the extension of protection
  - 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
  - Convention on “climate refugees”? “Survival migrants”?

Figure 3

### 3. Specific provisions on the climate-migration nexus

- Mentions in decisions of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Allusions in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
- Consultations:
  - Nansen initiative on disaster-induced cross-border displacement (2012-15)
  - Platform on Disaster Displacement (since 2015)

Figure 4

## **Discussant comment**

**Kentaro Ono** (Honorary Consul of the Republic of Kiribati in Sendai)

\*This statement represents the personal views of the commentator, not the official position of the Government of Kiribati.

[Ono] Thank you very much. It's a great honor for me to be here, because I'm not an academic, so I might have to introduce myself: who is this non-academic guy? I'm Kentaro. Well, from appearance, I'm Japanese, with my name, but I am a Kiribati citizen. I was born in Sendai, and I grew up here until I was 15, and when I was 15, I moved to Kiribati alone, so in a sense, I am a migrant to Kiribati. And I'm a first-generation nikkei — nikkei means a Japanese descendant.

Giving a 15-minute presentation is kind of torture for me, because I love talking, but I'll try to make it as short as possible so that we will have much time for discussion, and I'm pretty much looking forward to having a very vigorous exchange of ideas, and what you have been discussing today, towards the end of today. Talking about climate change is no longer an issue of a country, Kiribati, or a part of the world, Pacific. In Japan, too, today, it's almost the end of October, what's the headline news? What's the headline today? Typhoon. Amazing. We are in the Northeast part of Japan, which is located in the Northeast Asia. This part of Japan has been hit by typhoons in every typhoon season, but not at this time of the year. So, it's indeed a global phenomenon and a global issue that all humankind has to tackle. Because humankind have gone through two devastating world wars. I believe humankind can solve any issue, and believe that humankind has resolved not to engage into the world war as devastating as the last two wars. The real challenge therefore of the humankind in this 21<sup>st</sup> century right now is this issue, the climate change, because it touches from culture to security, it touches from prosperity to survival, for us in Kiribati, for our brothers and sisters in Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, for our brothers and sisters in Bangladesh. It's a matter of survival, and we are now in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, talking about humanity. We are talking about where are we in this era of humanity. Where are we? Let me emphasize and stress this, it is very important and please do understand that we don't want to leave our islands. And it is an indispensable prerequisite that we don't want to leave the islands, and we don't want to talk about our islands, our country, is disappearing. We don't want to talk about it. We don't even want to imagine that, because, like Mr. Campbell exactly said, for us, we are land. We are all attached to land. We are all attached to our island. We are all attached to our home, and if physically these lands are disappearing, our presence will disappear as well. This is our belief in the Pacific. But, having said that, it is always important to have a worst-case scenario. So, an opportunity like this, I am very grateful, because we must always prepare ourselves for the worst scenario, which we don't want to happen.

According to the World Bank scenario, by 2050, at the worst scenario, 80% of the land mass of Kiribati will go underwater. Seriously, we don't want that to happen. There is always talking about climate refugees. To be honest with you, we, in Kiribati, are not very happy with this term. Refugees sometimes come with a very negative image: a negative perception that we can be a burden to the recipient country, or our

host country. So, yes, perhaps a new term, like climate-displaced people but we don't want to be climate refugees. We don't want to be put in the refugee camp. Our status is being "processed"? Why the hell do we have to be "processed"? Whereas we could live happily on our beautiful islands. So perhaps that's the terminology that the world — that we might have to pledge to the global community to come up with a new term.

There is an application by a fellow Kiribati brother, who applied for refugee status in New Zealand. To be honest, his application was not really welcomed in Kiribati, because the grounds of his application was that Kiribati is disappearing, the living condition is getting worse, and it's totally filthy, and the children there have a very poor education. It may be right, but we took it as a little bit of an insult because, we still have 110,000 people living on these beautiful islands. And the grounds that he gave were a little bit of an insult, because — who are we, why are we living on these islands if the condition in Kiribati is that bad. So, that's what happened.

Conventional refugees — yes, this climate refugee is a totally new concept, but we have to face and tackle it. And yes, as I said, what if we come up with a new term, or if there is any legal framework that can be recognized as maybe climate mobility, or something like that. Because it's always our feeling and thinking that climate change is not something that we caused but we are in the frontline. Kiribati is the second-lowest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, but we are the first ones to see the effects of climate change. And some would argue that, wait a minute, there is no climate change. It's only natural for this earth to have some submerging islands and emerging islands if what is happening is not caused by the climate change. The difference at that time and now is that we, human beings, are living on these beautiful islands, so if that is the case what should we do with this earth cycle, this global cycle, that islands are going under the sea, how can we be treated? It's a very big challenge, because it's a totally unprecedented challenge, because the legal framework, again, Mr. Mayer had a very good presentation, and gave me inspiration that, at the worst scenario, if our country disappears, what about our sovereignty? Can a lost nation maintain sovereignty? Or can a lost nation claim its territorial waters? I think that's a big challenge to the international community, perhaps in the legal society as well.

We have been pledging for this new term: migration with dignity. We simply don't want to migrate to other countries as a refugee, because if the worst scenario happens, and if the entire population has to leave the islands, we want to leave with dignity. So that's a term that we have been pledging to the global community. Because if the perception is that the refugees are a group of people who lost their land, it would be making a perception that those who lost their land are kind of losers. And losers have to depend on the mercy of the winner who maintains land. We don't want that. And yes, Mr. Campbell had a very good presentation. I was very impressed because he understands us very well. And we are very grateful for that. In the worst-case scenario, the rest of the population in the Pacific which is over 1.8 million, which is peanuts for this global community may be displaced. Why, until now, when this climate change is real, the global community is still tumbling on them facing the reality? The life of 1.8 million is a big number, but perhaps for other countries, it won't be big. For example, Japan is in a very negative depopulation trend, and Japan has also a very similar climate with other parts of the world, like Okinawa, and Amami Islands. We might as well be adapted to these islands as a new resident.

You talked about distance, and for us, living in London is totally like living on the moon. But for us, living in perhaps the outer islands in Okinawa or Amami, could be a reality, because the climate is similar.

I'm sorry my comments have been fragmented, but lastly, I want to say thank you, because it is a blessing in disguise that in my hometown, Sendai, this kind of symposium is held. What an honor for me. If I recall right, Mother Teresa said, what is the opposite of love? The opposite of love is not hatred. The opposite of love is ignorance and indifference, and you are here to enlighten the global community about what should humankind do when the worst scenario comes, and we really want to see the action that our security is maintained. Our existence is maintained, and so accumulation of discussion in a symposium like this is really encouraging us that our security and our survival is somewhat secured. I think that's it from me, Professor Asuka, and ladies and gentlemen. I'm looking forward to hearing the discussion afterward. Thank you very much.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. I'm very happy to hear that in your country, that this workshop is very important for everybody, and yes, indifference and ignorance, that's what I try to tackle and the main reason I tried to organize this workshop in Sendai. So, we are supposed to have some reply from the three presenters. Any kinds of thoughts would be useful for us, so could you start, Nina?

[Hall] Yeah, thank you again. For me the three presentations worked really well together. For those of you who are new to the topic, understanding the complexity of it — it's a lot to understand, the complexity of the links, like Benoit said, between climate change and displacement, climate change and migration, and also how different communities view those links, and what the needs are. For the other comments, in the case of Kiribati these conversations are evolving. So, in the 1990s, when I was doing my research, I noted that no one talked about climate change and migration. They might have talked about environment and migration, but only in the 2000s did climate change and migration get linked, and that's because climate change became widely accepted as a major problem only in the mid-2000s. Then NGOs started to say that there is a humanitarian impact of climate change and outline some of the arguments that Benoit mentioned. And so, we've seen real changes in the international policy arena in the last two decades. I tried to chart some of that discussion in my talks. Benoit also highlighted some of the changes through the platform for disaster risk reduction, but these are ongoing processes, and ongoing conversations, and so I think for us in the room, it's interesting to reflect, where would we like them to be, what are the ideal scenarios going forward? Do we want more governments like New Zealand to come forward and say, well, we would accept and take people, maybe not as climate refugees, but as part of immigration pathways? Or do we think we should focus in other directions and put more money into adaptation funding? Or should we be doing both? And how do we deal with Bangladesh? These are the sorts of questions that are driving the conversation now.

[Campbell] Actually, one thing — I had a Ph.D. student from Kiribati. And he talked to people in a number of parts of his country. And another Ph.D. student from Tuvalu who did a similar study. And he found that the majority of people don't want to migrate. They want to stay. And a number of them toyed with the idea, or had the idea,

can we somehow build an artificial island, things along those lines. Even if there were just enough for a few people to stay, to continue to have their community, to have that link to the land. And a number of them referred to some work that had been done in Japan on artificial islands. Now, a lot of people dismissed this as being fanciful. But to people who are facing losing their land, it's better than nothing. And I wonder if there is just a thought, when they first mentioned it to me, I was skeptical, but there's a possibility, that there could be technology that can somehow enable at least some people to live near their land or on their land in an artificial way, so again, I mentioned it would be very expensive, but that's something that a number of people have said they would like examined, as an alternative to migration, for people who don't want to migrate. There are people who do want to migrate, and that's fine. And migration is, as everyone has said, there are some real benefits, and people benefit from it, but not everybody wants to go. So, that would be my observation.

The other thing is that there is still uncertainty about what will happen. Some research done by Paul Kench who is an expert on atolls has found no evidence that atolls are actually using land area. One of the things that happens to atolls is that the sand shifts around, so it erodes in one place but builds up in another. They are quite unstable environments. And the real problem occurs when people live on an atoll, and set up infrastructure, and the atoll becomes inflexible. So, there is still doubt. There's not 100% certainty, scientifically, that atolls will disappear, so there's a little bit of hope there, but there's a lot of scientific debate, but he has done detailed research on atolls throughout the Pacific, and looked at changing morphology of the atolls over 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years, as far as he can find aerial photographs, and he is not finding the evidence, but yet when you talk to people who live on the atolls, they say no, we are getting more floods. The land has eroded. One of the things that is happening is what is known as "king tides." These are the very high tides that you get twice a year. The atoll actually becomes underwater. The water bubbles up underneath the land. Because the atoll is made of coral, and the coral is very porous, so the water can percolate through the atoll. It didn't happen before and the magnitudes currently being experienced, and now it's happening regularly, so there is a lot of debate between people who live on the atolls and what some of the scientists are saying.

But I think we still have to cling to a little bit of hope that the worst might not happen. Hope for the best, but plan for the worst.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. I think making artificial islands may be easier than going to Mars.

[Mayer] Thank you very much. I'm very thankful for the comments by his excellency, Kentaro Ono. You asked a question about sovereignty of flooded islands, so if the island is completely flooded, what happens to the state? And that's a question which has never been encountered in the development of international law, so the only honest response is, "I have no idea." And I guess nobody has. The response will be given when it happens. But my understanding, however, is that no state has taken initiative in saying, you don't exist anymore. So, there will be a continuing recognition of the state, but I don't imagine one state saying you can't enter the UN anymore, you're not a state, because you lost your territory, because that would be extremely unfair and un-diplomatic. Likewise, for the territorial waters of the flooded island. It's an

important economic question for the fishing rights. Or the internet domain for Tuvalu (.tv), which may be a significance source of income. I think those rights will just continue, even if the state is entirely flooded. I hope this never happens, however.

But just a final remark to add. Those are very important, intriguing questions: what happens to small island states with all these impacts of temperature? But these are not the only questions we should speak about when we speak about climate change and migration. There are 1.5 million people in the Pacific islands. There are hundreds of millions of people affected in different ways in South India, Africa, and different places. In Bangladesh, the population is close to 300 million people. So, those actually tend to be less prominent on the political agenda. We tend to forget them. Small island developing states receive relatively big amounts of international development aid, and they need them, but other countries that need this development aid don't receive it, because they don't receive the same attention, especially Bangladesh, especially, which is a country that has a very strong impact of climate change. May be one of the cases where the impact of climate change is most directly related to migration. And yet, there is relatively little aid going there, so this might be the top priority.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. Then, I'd like to open it to the floor, so any comments, questions, or counter-arguments, please.

[Question] Thank you for the three presentations. I've got two questions. One is directed to Nina and Benoit, and the second one is directed to John. So, the first one: it seemed that in both of your presentations, you were coming at the subject from what you might call a humanitarian perspective – from a human rights perspective. And then, Benoit, in your presentation, you mentioned the discourses. There's a human rights discourse, and there is also a security discourse. And obviously, the title of our seminar here is security perspectives. Your presentations, to me, seemed to come from this humanitarian perspective. How can you, from that perspective, engage with people who are coming in from a security perspective? If you are going to feel very strongly about the humanitarian aspect, what's the way that you can use your arguments to engage with people who say that's not so important, and you need to look at this as a security issue?

And then the second question, to John, about the migration. I was wondering what's the role of age in the islands who are migrating? I was wondering how — older generations might feel very strongly about their attachment to the land, but I'm wondering if that is necessarily the case with, say, younger generations? Do younger generations think, well, actually, we might have to move for economic reasons? I'm just slightly concerned that maybe we're trying to generalize for all generations, when maybe actually younger generations might have a different perspective from older ones. Those are the two questions.

[Hall] Thanks for the question. I don't see it as a traditional security issue, and like many who work in this field, I try to stop or combat the language that frames migrants or refugees as a security threat. As the security discourse is leading to the build-up of massive walls and fences around Europe, which legitimizes the notion that we have to keep people out. And I don't know the discourse in Japan, but certainly in Europe, where I live, this is how it's commonly conceived, and I see problems with that.

In the academic discourse there are some ways that you can link migration and climate change to discussions around human security. We heard that early, that the human security of individuals, whether they are living in Kiribati or Bangladesh, is threatened by climate change, so rather than focusing on the state we should focus on their livelihoods. In the political discourse, what I think is interesting to note is that major players like NATO, and US politicians, started to think about climate change as a security threat, which elevated it. Suddenly, people in very senior positions in the US military and NATO started to think about climate change, and some might argue that's a good thing in the sense that it's permeating other institutions. However, if the link is made in a simplistic fashion where climate change is a threat because we're need to stop migrants, and we don't want them, that's where I would really try and push back.

[Mayer] I really agree with what Nina said, which is that I'm kind of skeptical with human security, because I believe when you speak about human security, you lose the human rights, and you just go to security and you kind of betray the starting point. So, I think the two spheres have to stay separate. Human rights and security are different, and knowing that they are not the same is important. However, they are not totally contradictory, and I believe in the long term, international human rights protection is what a state should do for its own security. It's not a long-term strategy to build a wall to try to keep migrants abroad. It doesn't work in the long-term. It creates some wall, then you have more migrants or some other unstable situation to solve. In the long-term, every state has to pay attention to other states. That's why states have engaged international solidarity. The origin of the 1951 Convention is actually trying to solve an issue to evolve the security issue. Refugees are protected for security reasons, and I believe if you engage well with the security perspective, then we can have an argument which is politically acceptable for the protection of all forced migrants.

[Campbell] There is an age issue. There is more migration amongst the group that is in their 20s and 30s, for example, throughout the Pacific, and also young families.

But in terms of desire not to be forced to migrate, I think that's across generations. In fact, some of the most vocal people saying I don't want to leave my island are young people. The older people might be more resigned to it, and say, well, I'm just going to die here, but from what I've seen, I don't have data or anything, but my general impression is that migration definitely is that able-bodied age group, which is what you would expect, but in terms of forced relocation, that would be whole communities.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. Other questions? Any comments?

[Question] Let me raise a fairly simple and basic question. According to many speakers, it is very hard to prove the nexus between climate change and concrete natural disasters and also the nexus with migration. Then, how can we know the existence of that problem? Probably this might be solved with a simple thought, but I think this might be a lasting question for this topic. So, will any of these three speakers answer me?

[Campbell] That's a big issue. For over a century, migration studies have rejected

the possibility of environmental causation. The focus has been work mostly by sociologists and human geographers, what have you. And they look for social, economic, and political causes. But a lot of economic migration can be triggered by environmental degradation. But the group that I call forced relocation, to me, there would be no doubt. If an island disappears, that's environmentally forced migration. There's no other cause. The island has become unlivable. So, I think we can say, in those cases, that is a clearly environmental migration. The other ones, where you get some degradation and it induces migration, I think that's much more difficult, but I think that through time, we can develop some mechanisms that can look at the level of degradation of a place, and can assess how that has affected livelihoods and other aspects of life, and get some kind of way of maybe indexing or saying that a certain amount of the reason for a decision to migrate can be attributed to climate change or environmental degradation. But we're not there yet. There are always other factors, but I think at least in the case when a place becomes unlivable, there's no choice. You migrate, and the cause is environmental.

[Hall] I think one of the issues that we didn't explore as much here is cases of slow onset climate change. So, for instance, my research in Kenya where you look at droughts occurring — you talked about this in the Mongolian context. You might see a drought in the Horn of Africa which would lead people to not get as many crops, and therefore, there may be famine, and therefore, people may move. There would be a whole lot of interlinked factors. Now, one of the issues more broadly when we're speaking about the nexus between climate change and migration is that it encompasses so many different forms of migration, which is why both Benoit and I were both highlighting this difficulty of it. But I think returning to a more specific regional context, like the Pacific, like John's work, you can see how you might be able to distinguish some particular categories of people. Because from a policy or a legal perspective, the question is who are the people in need, and how do we identify them? Do we identify them based on categories of how much environment has driven them, how much climate change, or how much they are in need? And I think that's where — I guess Benoit was also saying this point — that we shouldn't be identifying people by what has caused them to move, but based on need. So, it's not directly answering your question, except to say that for scientific purposes, there may be good reason to try to understand how much the environment has impacted on somebody's decision. However, for policy response, I would argue that's not the best way forward.

[Campbell] The only thing I'd say in that regard is that if you're looking at climate change, there's a cause, and you can make a case for compensation.

[Mayer] I agree that there's a cause and the consequence of the need for protection. But in terms of compensation, the population which moves usually is not the most vulnerable — they are those who can afford to move. So, if you want compensation, if it was on the negotiating table (it is not at the moment but it should be), then the discussion should not be specifically about migration. It should be not only about the impacts of climate change, including migration, but about all the impacts of climate change, including for instance what some called “involuntary non-migration”: the inability of people, getting poorer and poorer, to migrate to a better place.

[Ono] Thank you very much for that question, because that really touches what I

have been doing. In Kiribati, we are experiencing something that we never have experienced before. Once-in-50-years, once-in-60-years, experience of a weather phenomenon is occurring a couple times a year now. For example, in 2015, when the biggest cyclone in the Southern Hemisphere hit in Vanuatu, this cycle was called Cyclone Pam — the effect of Cyclone Pam was felt in Kiribati. We are 3500 kilometers apart. Huge waves and swells from this cyclone hitting Vanuatu 3500 kilometers away have washed all our islands away — I mean, all our islands were flooded because of the swell. And this climate change and global warming is said to increase the intensity of the typhoons. And I have been visiting schools here in Miyagi to tell the children in this part of Japan to understand what's going on, and for them to take action. I'm trying to deliver a very simple message: this global warming and climate change is a man-made catastrophe. And because it's man-made, humankind has to solve this. It's something very simple. And it's nothing about the story of Mars or Jupiter. It's occurring on this earth, so I'm trying to deliver this message as simple as possible. Something wrong is really going on. Yes, the scientific data may contradict — may show some contradiction, and some claim that atolls are growing — the sands are moving. Some countries are building islands and infrastructure on atolls but why can't we? Only simply because we are living in Kiribati, and we can't enjoy the benefit of this civilization? It's not fair. And that's the comment from me. Thanks.

[Asuka] Thank you very much. I will just add kind of scientific thing, about the causality. I think the modern science is quite developed in terms of the probability of occurrence of heat waves and especially heavy rain. Those two impacts can be calculated, attributed, to specific events — not specific CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, but with some probability. For example, the heat wave this summer in Europe was 10 times higher — was 10 times smaller without climate change caused by human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Of course, it's probability and some people don't like probability, but we have to think about precautionary principles, so I think it's mingled with all this narrative and logic to do something. But again, I think the problem is the priority of the politics, and it is very important, but maybe some people say what's more important is the famine in Africa, but of course, it's very connected. Any other questions or comments?

[Chi] Sorry, I should have mentioned this earlier, but I had a slight concern with a comment that you made, your honorable excellency Ono-san. You said that you don't like to use the word “refugee”, and that you'd rather use the word “migration with dignity.” Now, I understand, but at the same time, I think you're putting two things — you're kind of denying the true meaning of refugee, because refugees don't have a choice, do they. So, while I understand, as a person, because it's not something that was not caused by the people who are affected, I perfectly understand that point. But at the same time there are refugees around the world that — obviously it wasn't their fault, as well. So, I just had a slight concern with that, that's it.

[Asuka] Any other comments?

[Question] Just a brief comment. Mr. Ono, you mentioned about losing a home, if the island is gone, and the home, and I was just wondering if a similar case would be Fukushima, where the local municipalities, they lost their land, and they were forced to move all their relief functions to other cities? So that might be a similar case. That's all.

[Asuka]: And we have many legal issues in Japan. Any other questions or comments?

[Question] I'm a little bit confused after listening to your presentation, and that is that my impression is that it seems it's better not to use the word "climate change" or "refugee" and instead use words like "migration" to solve this problem caused by human movements. I think it's sort of a general message, especially as Professor Hall and Professor Ono were saying, it's that the international community or the countries are more willing to cooperate if it's called migration. But introducing the word "climate change" is actually hindering the cooperation, or something. So probably I'm getting the wrong message from the presentation, so I would be glad if you could provide more clarification. Thank you.

[Asuka] Terminology is very complicated.

[Mayer] The difficulty is that, if we say that we have to protect climate refugees, we seem to imply that all other forced migrants don't need protection or do not deserve as much protection as those forced to migrate because of climate change. This suggests that the protection needs of those displaced for instance by a nuclear explosion are less pressing than the protection needs of those displaced by climate change – but why? My argument is that all migrants deserve protection. If you are forced to migrate, whatever the cause.

[Hall] Thank you. And I know this is confusing in terms of terminology, so it's good to ask for clarification. Maybe some of the underlying assumptions that both Benoit and I have is an idealist world, in which we don't have refugees that states have obligations to. Also, people who are forced to move because they don't grow enough crops, that could be to do with climate change, or it could be because they live in Zimbabwe, and suddenly there is an economic collapse and that they have to move. So, acknowledging that, morally, we want to help people who are in need, and that the international community should have an obligation. Therefore, the language, many argue, is too narrow in some regards by just looking at climate change; that we want to be careful not to create a new category that then misses out other people. So that's one assumption, that we're trying to be ambitious.

Then, the second question is, what's the realpolitik? The argument we heard before, where John said, actually, using climate change might be important, because then you can develop legal arguments to say states have obligations to help these people because they caused the climate change. So, Britain, or the US, had the most emissions, and therefore, they should be helping Kiribati, for instance. That's one element of realpolitik. Another element, though, that I see more strongly, unfortunately is that no state wants to take in the refugees they're supposed to. We know today, under Trump, with Brexit, living in Europe at the moment — all states are trying to close their borders. Even Germany, which under Chancellor Merkel in 2015 opened up their borders to refugees has restricted entry significantly and is deporting many asylum seekers. If we can't even help those people who some would argue are most in need — such as refugees fleeing from Syria — and if we try and push for these new categories, the most vulnerable may lose protection. So there may be an idealist vision of where we want to push international law, but it's going to be difficult to get there. At the moment, Nansen, the platform for disaster, are some

kind of soft middle ground for people to talk, but the hard thing is getting any real significant change. That's the challenge for the international community, for us in the room, to think about. And it would be interesting to know what role Japan could play in that process.

[Asuka] Thank you very much, and just one quick comment about Japan. The reason I started getting interested in this kind of issue is because some people say that the turmoil happening in Syria now was caused by climate change. And I listened to the BBC or something like that, and I was a bit shocked to know that; well, it's one of the big reasons. But there are no comments or news or remarks on that issue in Japan. So, I wrote a small article in a Japanese newspaper, and everybody was quite surprised to know. And there was some newspaper — people asked me if there is any evidence or something like that, — of course, it's very difficult to say 1:1 cause/effect between climate change and the Syrian war, but at least some people started to think about it this way and talk about it this way, but in Japan, not so much. That's why I thought we should move Japanese people more, and raise more awareness by doing this kind of workshop. So, I think that objective has been kind of successful here in Sendai, and I'm very happy to listen to your presentations and conversations, and now, we have to think about how we can move forward to the next stage.

Thank you very much.

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